The 1st International Conference in person
January 7 and 8, 2023
The 1st large Room, Faculty of Literature, the University of Tokyo
Opened to the public both in the classroom and online

  This time, we could have an international conference in person at last. We invited seven members from abroad as well as two guests from Japan (Professor Michael Braddick participated via a video and Professor David Bell online).
  In the program, we arranged the revolutions in reverse order, different from customary practice. This was because a truly global comparison of revolutions demanded highlighting the revolutions such as Japan’s Meiji Revolution and the Iranian revolutions. They had been ignored because they deviated from the French or Russian models of revolutions, which had been considered the standard models of revolution in the 20th century. Readers may see this effort’s positive results in the following record of the general discussion held at the end of the second day. 

Keynote speech

Hiroshi Mitani, Re-thinking Revolutions through Global Comparison 

Summaries and PPTs of presentations 

General Discussion 

1. Comments by Hiroshi Watanabe (History of Japanese political thoughts, member of the Japan Academy, Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo)

  I am not a member of the study group that organized this symposium. I happen to be here among you only because I was kindly invited by my longtime friend Dr. Hiroshi Mitani. For someone in that position to try to say something about twenty substantial presentations and comments is a challenge indeed, which is why I will restrict myself to making three observations from something of an outsider’s point of view.


1) The concept of “revolution”

  Sometimes I come across books and essays with titles like Is Confucianism a Religion? or Confucianism as a Religion. Quite likely there are works with similar titles about Shinto and Buddhism as well. But a book titled Is Christianity a Religion? we will surely never encounter.

  Why not? Because the Western word “religion” in itself signifies an entity that is like Christianity. What is more, the Japanese word for “religion,” shūkyō, was coined in the modern age as a translation of the Western term, later passing into Chinese and Korean to become zongjiao and jonggyo, respectively.

  It follows that asking whether Confucianism is a religion is, in effect, tantamount to asking how and to what degree it resembles Christianity. So the answer is bound to be that as a religion Confucianism is “peculiar” or “lacking.” Max Weber famously characterized Confucianism as secular, rational, and bureaucratic in Konfuzianismus und Taoismus, but it only stands to reason that someone who sets out assuming that Confucianism is a religion and compares it with Protestantism and the like is going to find it abnormally secular. ( In Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck],1922). Translated by Hans H. Gerth as The Religion of China (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1951)).

  Much the same happens whenever we employ Western concepts to discuss history, culture, and society in Asia, Africa, and other non-Western areas of the world. We Asians have done this ourselves ad nauseam. Historians of modern Japan, for example, have debated whether Japan ever had a bourgeoisie, or civil society, or public sphere; whether the Japanese truly possess a modern ego; whether the Meiji Constitution might only have succeeded in establishing a quasi-constitutional monarchy; and, indeed, whether Japan’s so-called modernization deserves to be called such in the true sense of the word. Or at least this has been the case up to a few decades ago.

  The term “revolution” is another instance of this phenomenon, it seems to me. When we ask whether the Meiji Ishin was a revolution or not, we do so with the French Revolution foremost, and after that the later Russian Revolution, in our minds. In short, our debates have centered on whether the Meiji Ishin passes muster compared with these “real” revolutions. And the result has been, as Dr. Mitani noted in his opening address, that “scholars both inside and outside Japan have deemed the Ishin an incomplete revolution.”

  But why do we never question whether the French Revolution deserves that name? The obvious answer is that it is because the word “revolution” is in itself understood to denote events like the French or Russian Revolution.

  I see no real meaning in attempting to describe the entire range of historical phenomena in the world by pointing out where they fail to fit concepts that derive from the European historical experience. What benefit does that bring—aside from acknowledging our Western-centrism, that is? Or if it is meaningful, then it should be equally possible to turn the tables and adopt the Meiji Ishin as the standard against which to consider the so-called revolutions in France, or Russia, or China. It might be interesting to take the Iranian Revolution as the benchmark, in fact.

  Overall I felt that this symposium, though heading somewhat in the direction of this kind of relativization, nevertheless still maintained the French Revolution model, sometimes explicitly, and sometimes implicitly.

  Focusing on the French and Russian Revolutions as the models for our thinking brings with it a number of concrete disadvantages. First, as Dr. Fuess pointed out yesterday, it has caused the German Revolution to be all but ignored in the shadow of the Russian Revolution. The German Revolution took place in the heart of Europe within a major power that was a world leader in industry and learning at that time in the early twentieth century. In its own time, it was called die größte aller Revolutionen—the greatest of all revolutions—and yet it was not held up for comparison in this symposium, save in one passing mention by Dr. Ikeda. (See Robert Gerwarth, Die größte aller Revolutionen: November 1918 und der Aufbruch in eine neue Zeit (Munich: Siedler, 2018). Published in English as November 1918: The German Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) ). It seems to me that we need to expand our scope to include the short-term German Revolution of 1918, or perhaps the longer revolutionary period in Germany until 1945.

  Second, the conventional model prevents us from considering great transformative events such as the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of fifteen new states at the end of the last century, for the simple reason that they are not usually termed revolutions. But doesn’t the collapse of the Soviet Union qualify as a revolution? If not, why? Is it because its case was one of the changes initiated from within the leadership unexpectedly ballooning into a major transformation, and not of a movement led by the people from the ground up? But if we go by that reasoning, then the Meiji Ishin would not be a revolution, either.

  Well, if the Meiji Ishin turns out not to have been a revolution after all, then that’s that. The important point is that we should keep ourselves from being too tied down to certain concepts.


  One remedy might be to stop using the word “revolution” to describe the events we seek to study, given its inextricable associations with the French Revolution. We might, for example, posit a model of “great change” that integrates rapid and sweeping changes in three spheres—political, socioeconomic, and cultural (religious)—and turn this symposium into a global comparison of “times of great change.” Or we might take a cue from the Japanese subtitle and adopt “regime change” as our theme.

 The three spheres of change that I listed might be visualized as the points of a triangle,like this.

  In some cases, such as the Meiji Ishin, political change comes first and goes on to stimulate changes in the social and cultural spheres. In other cases, cultural change will lead by some chance to political change, which will, in turn, generate social as well as further cultural change; the French Revolution might be considered an example of this pattern. Or the process might begin with social change and spread from there to the other two spheres.

  Sometimes there will be greater weight placed on one, or perhaps two, of the three spheres. Dr. Wanibuchi noted that the American Revolution was not accompanied by large-scale social transformation. The same can probably be said of the July and February Revolutions in France.


  To summarize, the first observation I would like to make is that we should perhaps not take the use of the word “revolution” as a given, but also consider the possibility of adopting other words, other concepts. To people who are attached to the excitement, the glamour, the heroism of the word “revolution,” the alternatives will no doubt seem much too prosaic and boring. But then again, unexciting is probably preferable in academic inquiry.


2) “Nation” and “democratization”

  Having said as much, I will admit that a description such as “great and rapid political/social/cultural change” is much too abstract for the purposes of historical analysis. Such a framework might apply equally to changes in ancient and medieval times as to those in the modern age. As has been repeatedly pointed out in these sessions, our greatest concern is with accounting for those historical phenomena that are linked, first, to the formation, maintenance, and development of the nation and, second, to ideas and movements that seek to put government and/or the state in the hands of the people who live under it.
 * table
  Here it may be useful to turn to one of the classics of modern political science, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) by the major late-twentieth-century American scholar Robert Dahl (1915–2014). Dahl gave the name “polyarchy,” which he distinguished from democracy as an ideal, to political systems in which people effectively enjoy a fair degree of political participation as well as the ability to publicly contest their government. Say we take as our starting point a regime in which people have neither and must obey the government as mute subjects (bottom left corner of the chart). If we proceed from there toward greater public contestation, then we arrive at a liberal oligarchy. But if the people are subsumed into politics without guarantees of their ability to oppose the government, we move to the right toward not so much political participation as mobilization and ultimately fascism, totalitarianism, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea. If we gain both greater participation and contestation—if, for example, a regime turns first into an oligarchy that permits open contestation, and then slides over to the right toward increased political participation—then the result will be polyarchy, or liberal democracy as we usually understand it. 

  I think we might plot nations including Japan on this chart according to their trajectories from the bottom left corner. If we do, we will be able to envisage nation formation as a phenomenon that accompanies movement along the horizontal axis toward greater participation or mobilization, as the case may be. The possibility of public contestation determines whether this movement leads to democracy in the usual sense of the word, or to a repressive and totalitarian regime. 

  The key point here is that the realization of a nation and of public participation does not necessarily bring about a free democracy. Without the freedom to contest the government, it may, indeed, breed oppression of the worst kind. It is no coincidence that many revolutions initiated by the populace end with the emergence of a repressive regime. 

  Going back now to my proposed alternative for the word  “revolution,” we might expand it to “a historical event marked by a combination of great and rapid political/ social/ cultural changes that entail, or further the growth of, public participation.” That, I would venture to say, would enable us to cover everything including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iranian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the German Revolution, the Meiji Ishin, the French Revolution, and the American Revolution right down to the political upheavals in seventeenth-century Britain. 


  We might also take the other tack and focus on the dimension of nation-building instead. The nineteenth century onward witnessed the founding of a succession of centralized nation-states driven by the mindset that without the support of an actively participating populace, a state could not hope to win out in the race for survival against other states. Seen in that light, the political transformation in Japan from 1867 to 1871, the unification of Italy in 1870, and the 1871 birth of the German Reich all appear—as Dr. Fuess pointed out yesterday—not only contemporaneous but quite similar. It might also be possible to include the Chinese Revolution here as well, in fact. 

  It may therefore be fruitful to consider world-historical events based not on whether or not they are usually termed “revolutions,” but on how they reflect nation-building and associated transformations motivated by the all-consuming fear that one must scramble to catch up to the front of the pack or else be done for. 


3) Violence 

  Finally, I would like to affirm one point about change and violence—namely, that there is no need to assume that sociopolitical change must necessarily involve violence and numerous acts of assault, injury, and murder. 

  Great sociopolitical change is, simply put, the sweeping reform of social and political institutions. Institutions are not people; they are patterns of human behavior. Set those patterns down in itemized form, and we have what are called rules or laws. Being behavioral, the patterns themselves can be neither seen nor touched. And while a word like “regime” may sound grand and imposing, it merely denotes a set of social and political institutions and, as such, is likewise nothing but behavioral patterns drawn up inside people’s heads and manifested in the outside world. Historians of the old type might pen phrases like “The old regime came tumbling down with a roar,” but of course in reality there would have been no sound. 

  Institutional change thus does not require bloodshed. It is, by rights, not something that should be accomplished by military force. Institutions will change readily and soundlessly as long as the people responsible for them agree that it should be so, as happens in ordinary times when we revise a law. To end a monarchy there is no need to kill the monarch. Only the political body of the monarch need be killed; the physical body need not be touched. 

  In this sense, I believe that a violent revolution is an institutional reform gone awry. The French Revolution? A miserable failure. 

  Of course, there are times in this world when debate and persuasion are insufficient, necessitating inducement, intimidation, coercion, and yes, murder. Violence is at times quite effective. Still, murder is murder—the taking of human life. 

  Some 22,000 lives were lost in the March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. That number is fewer than the 105,000 deaths in the September 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake, but even so, we would never call it “little.” The loss of 20,000 lives is a calamity—a catastrophe—regardless of how it compares with anything else. Considering that revolutions are wrought not by nature, as earthquakes are, but by humans, it seems rather cold-hearted to claim that the 30,000 or so deaths in the fighting associated with the Meiji Ishin are negligible compared with casualties in other revolutions in terms of proportion of the total population. 

  The anarchistic leftist author Yutaka Haniya (1909–1997), following years of long and anguished thought brought upon by his shock over Stalin’s purges and other events, was ultimately led to assert that “revolution is the reform of institutions, not the obliteration of human beings” and that “institutions are the enemy, all humans are allies, and the power of cognition is an ally among allies.” (Haniya Yutaka, “Mokuteki wa shudan o jōka shiuruka” [Does the end justify the means?] (1958);“Teki to mikata” [Enemies and allies] (1959).) 

  We must never become accustomed to violence and bloodshed. That all revolutionaries, in particular, will think as Haniya did, and that scholars of revolutions such as yourselves will also reflect on his words from time to time—that is my hope, however naïve it may seem. 


2. Discussion (moderated by Yoshiro Ikeda) 

Ikeda: We will now begin the general discussion. First, what is your response to the question raised by Prof. Hiroshi Watanabe, Prof. Mitani? Yes, later, I guess. I think that all the members here, especially Japanese scholars of Western history, must reflect on and respond to the question that we should not be stuck by the concept of "revolution" cast by the French or Russian Revolutions. 

  So, does anyone have any comments on this issue or on the discussion that has been going on since yesterday? 


Wasserstrom: When I started studying Chinese history, one of the issues that we often talked about and that was missing from yesterday's discussion was the difference between revolution and rebellion, Western observers of the Taiping Heaven observed that the Chinese were the most rebellious and least revolutionary people on earth. While there was a long tradition of peasant rebellion, there was also a tendency toward new dynasties. In this discussion, there was a reference in the British uprising section to an "animal farm"-like situation in which the new ruler is exactly like the previous one. The same is true of Egypt after the Arab Spring. As for China, "The True Story of Ah Q" notes that the revolution of 1911 seemed to the local people only to have changed the names of those in power. 

  Revolution can be seen as a move toward a new structure. However, whether or not people believe that progress is another matter. In the case of the Meiji Restoration, although the emperor remained in power, there was clear progress toward a new structure. The French Revolution, on the other hand, saw a restoration and a return to a monarchy. I am surprised that rebellion was not discussed this time. 


Cole: Listening to today's discussion, I thought about the relationship between revolution and bureaucratic and military organizations. In pre-modern times, there were groups dedicated to violence and hereditary through family lineage. The Mamluks of the Ottoman Empire are an example. Both in the Ottoman Empire and in Japan, modern revolutions have dissolved these warrior castes. 

  In revolutionary studies, the relationship with social stratification has often been studied. What I would like to focus on now is what Weber called status groups. What kind of relationship did they have with society and with each other? It can be a social group or an organization of any kind, such as a club, made up of common interests, but not necessarily a social class. Islamic jurists in the Iranian Revolution were not an economic social class but a status group. The privileged 1000 families of Shah's time were also a status group. The Iranian Revolution was a dramatic process, but one in which one status group was replaced by another. Similarly, in Japan, the samurai were replaced by a new status group. The revolution brought egalitarianism, but it could also be seen as the emergence of a new status group in the upper echelons of society. 


Goto: There is a term called Great Rebellion in the history of the study of British history. The first studies to emerge in criticism of the Marxist understanding of the British Revolution were the "Great Local Rebellion" arguments, popular in the 1970s, which made it clear that the redistribution of resources that Marxism focuses on did not occur. In the 1990s, however, the understanding took a turn and sought to find a revolutionary significance within the framework of Britain, rather than a mere Great Rebellion. What was that revolution? There was a major shift, a redefinition of national consciousness, of cultural and social values, which gave rise to "modernity.” 


Fukamachi: Watanabe's point is one that we have often discussed in our study groups. There is no need to give a clear definition of revolution and make a clear distinction between revolution and non-revolution. It would not be possible. Broadly speaking, a political system undergoes a major, short-term, and violent change. That is often called a revolution. 

  The problem, as Ikeda pointed out, is that there is a big difference between revolutions up to the 17th and 18th centuries and those after the late 19th century. The early revolutions were so named later, but after the end of the 19th century, the concept of "revolution" existed first, and the parties concerned consciously tried to start revolutions, referring to precedents in Britain, the U.S., France, and other countries. The Russian and Chinese revolutions were such self-proclaimed revolutions. On the other hand, a researcher may later define a revolution as a revolution. What should be the target of such a revolution? As Prof. Watanabe pointed out, it would be appropriate to limit it to modern changes related to nationalism. 


Watanabe: How was the Meiji Ishin named? It was not called a "revolution," and most Japanese still follow it. In China, a "revolution" is when a legitimate monarch becomes a tyrant and is deprived of heaven’s mandate, and a different person is given it and becomes a son of heaven. This is the original meaning. Yet, both the Meiji government and the royalists before believed that this was a restoration of the monarchy and not a revolution since they believed that the emperor had consistently been the legitimate sovereign of Japan. The Marxist and postwar interpretations of history considered the Ishin not to be a true revolution because it must be modeled on the French Revolution. The Kōza school of Marxists believed that the Meiji government was not a bourgeois regime but an absolutist one and that it could not be called a revolution because it was merely a transition from the feudal stage to the absolutist stage. Thus, both the left and right agreed that the Meiji Ishin was not a revolution. Hence, the convenient term "Ishin" has been used. Even now, students are surprised when I point out that the Ishin was a kind of revolution. I think it should be called a revolution, but I wonder when the day will come when textbooks will say so. 


Ikeda: Before I get into the individual discussions, I would like to lay out the general framework of the discussion. The second point of Watanabe's comment, the relationship between Nation and Democratization, and the third point Violence. Revolutions are characterized by the people’s participation in some way. There are two kinds of participation: one is the case people are directly involved as subjects of violence and the other is to appeal to the idea of "the people.” In both cases, the challenge is how to incorporate the people into the political system, and this challenge overlaps with the creation of a nation. 

  On the other hand, people in times of change are also objects of violence. At the same time, violence is needed from the side of the elites who mobilize and oppress the people. How the balance between the encouragement and suppression of violence is achieved will determine the nature of the post-revolutionary regime. There are cases in which the polity expands participation and creates a liberal regime, and there are other cases, such as the Soviet Union and People's China, in which the elite incorporates violence against the people into the regime in a latent form. 

  The issues of nation-building and violence can be grasped in a unified manner by incorporating the people. 


Ikeda: I would like to ask panelists to respond to the comments, beginning with the first session. 


Wanibuchi: This is the response to Bell. I interpreted the American Revolution as a typical revolution, not with the intention of drawing on the French or Russian Revolutions, but because I was focusing on the transition in the relationship between violence and public opinion, the cycle of a movement in which both open simultaneously and close at the end, as in other revolutions. Perhaps this is a somewhat inaccurate use of the term. 

  Park called the Meiji Ishin a "gradual revolution," a description that applies equally well to the American, French, and British revolutions. In the U.S., the revolutionary movement was a gradual one, quite different from those in the 20th century, which started with a goal in mind. It is rather typical that revolutions at that time started without an end goal. 


Hayakawa: On violence. I sympathize with Yutaka Haniya's argument and think that a revolution without violence, like the Velvet Revolution, is ideal. However, it is undeniable that the system moves in a different direction from what is desired and often leads to the extermination of human beings. 


Taira: In order to consider the relationship between violence and democratization, I focused on the elections during the French presidential government period. The task was to end the revolution and secure a republican government, which was considered to be the government's initiative. The government manipulated the elections to gain an advantage over the parliament and suppressed the violence that appeared in the elections by equating it as "illegitimate violence. There was also a movement toward popular democracy. Yet, Napoleon put an end to it. The government lost three elections except for the first one. Here we can see the second politics of fear that resulted from the strengthening of the government, and the movement toward democracy simultaneously. 


Ikeda: Dr. Kōji Takenaka online asked a question to Dr. Taira. The form of public opinion in the French Revolution may have changed depending on the period. In the early stages, the role of the media was important. As the revolution progressed, political associations also became important, and during the period of the presidential government, the results of the elections. Can we think of it this way? 


Taira: Elections are indeed a means of public opinion. However, elections do not necessarily reflect public opinion fairly and impartially. The government's suppression of divisive election rallies, which it viewed as violence, could also be viewed as public opinion. 


Ikeda: What form will public opinion take in the revolution? How does public opinion relate to the government, the elite, and the people? It depends on the period of the same revolution. 


(Ikeda:) Dr. Park Hun. It was a big proposal to review the revolution from the East Asian concepts. please. 

Park Hun: First, I would like to make two points in response to this conference as a whole. There were issues between revolution and public opinion, revolution and violence, and revolution and war, but there were no issues raised about the relationship between revolution and freedom. Today, finally, it came out in Shioide’s report and Watanabe's comments. As to why political freedom became possible in Japan, Shiode answered that it was the rule of no punishment without law. This question is related to Ikeda's Soviet-style public sphere and Ishikawa’s report on the way of life among Chinese revolutionaries who live as cogs. But how should we evaluate the suppression of freedom in revolutions? Shouldn't we discuss this issue while risking political value judgments? How should we evaluate the revolution that suppresses the rule of law and freedom? The crisis of the liberal regime is currently becoming an issue worldwide. Shouldn't we ask this question now? 

  Another thing that bothers me is that the concept of a Korean revolution does not exist. People think there was a revolution in North Korea, but given the more than one hundred years of Korean history since the 19th century, if we do not call this a revolution, where can we say there was a revolution? There have been major changes in all three aspects that Dr. Watanabe mentioned: political, social, and cultural. If we call it not a revolution but a regime change or big rapid changes, it is clearly one of them. India should also be considered. 

  In response to Iwai's question, one thing about Japan's liberal civil rights movement. This can be seen not only as the starting point of the Japanese democracy movement but also as the period when the "Chinese scholar-bureaucrat political culture" I have advocated reached its zenith. The Liberal Party, for example, considered itself to be a "patriot" and a "man of virtue,” and its activities were guided by the awareness that it was fully responsible for the country's future. For example, the Liberal Party referred to itself as the "virtuous party" and its opponents as the "fake party.” In some respects, this is reminiscent of the party struggles of the Joseon Dynasty. Therefore, we believe that it may be too early to regard the Liberal Civil Rights Movement as a transition from a traditional political culture to a modern political culture. 


Ikeda: I would like to respond to the question of freedom. In the first half of the 20th century, it was accepted with some reality that personal freedom was a thing of the past and that totalitarian or non-liberal freedom was superior. What kind of freedom did individual revolutions aim for, and why did they seem to choose liberal freedom in the case of the Meiji Revolution? 

A note from Dr. Suzuki in the audience commented that it would have been better to use the concept of constitutionalization. This could be considered in relation to liberal freedom. Mr. Mitsuharu Ishii asked what revolutions, if any, could be possible in contemporary countries. We will discuss this later. Dr. Fumiko Sugimoto also submitted a memo suggesting that we refer to her book "Early Modern Political History in Terms of Spatial Theory.” In our study group, we have had wide-ranging discussions on issues other than those discussed here. 


Shioide: I thought the most important point of Dr. Iwai's comment was that the Meiji Revolution was a combination of two genealogies, East Asia and the West. This is also related to the question of how to connect the 20th-century revolution with the Meiji Revolution. Dr. Fukamachi characterized the 20th century as consciously pursuing "revolution." If we consider the Meiji Ishin from its starting point, it was not a revolution in the Western sense, nor was it a revolution in the East Asian sense. At the same time, along the way, it began to be aware of models. One was the East Asian "county prefecture system" and the other was the Western "nation.” The latter arose from British pressure, namely the demand for a centralized state for a free market. This is relevant to the question of why Meiji Japan accepted the liberal order. 

  This stems from the principle of criminal law. Before freedom of speech, the West demanded the preservation of property rights and the personal safety of foreigners, which the feudal lords and patriots perceived as the global standard. The demand for incorporation by the West into the liberal order led to the restoration of the monarchy (which in turn led to the introduction of modern law). A revolution was not the goal, but the model was adopted later. 

  In Japan, this ceased to function in the 1920s/30s. Various movements for revolutionary purposes arose, which became contemporary with (and similar to) the non-Western revolutions of the 20th century. 


Ikeda: A member of the audience asked about the role of the Nishiki-e (color woodblock prints.) 


Shiode: Like Kawaraban (single-page newspaper), Nishiki-e gradually began to deal with politics. After the Meiji Ishin, newspapers with Nishiki-e were also created, combining traditional media with modern ones. 


Watanabe: Shioide's interpretation is that the liberal model was referred to in order to revise the unequal treaties, but how can we explain the vogue for (Western) civilization before that? Why were they eager to adopt the Western culture, even down to the customs of eating and drinking? It was because the West at that time was "civilized" from the perspective of East Asian values. In Wei Yuan's "Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms" and Xu Jiyu’s "A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit," we can see evaluations that were surprisingly good even from the perspective of Confucian scholars. For example, the assembly was a "public" system in which wise men were chosen from the community to participate in politics, and hospitals and orphanages were "benevolent" systems. They thought it wonderful that there were systems of "benevolence" that went beyond the mindset of men of virtue. Fukuzawa's "Western Affairs" was similar. He thought that it was more "Civilized" than "Chinese civilization," and that it was natural for men of virtue to learn from "Civilization.” 


Ikeda: During the chat, Mou Sheng Lin asked what role nationalism played in the revolution and the Meiji Revolution. Since the theme of revolutions is how to politicize the people and the nation, the relationship with nationalism is an important theme. 

  Next, I would like to return to the question of the larger framework. Ms. Mori from the audience asked how each of the revolutions succeeded when we consider the revolution as a long period and a series of smaller revolutions. For example, when we consider the Puritan Revolution to the Honorary Revolution as a series, what kind of succession relationship was there? Individuals are replaced from generation to generation, but the concepts and objectives born in the revolutions may be inherited. 


Goto: In the case of the long English Revolution, there was no revolution as a goal, but rather a restoration of the ancient national system. There was no conscious succession; it was merely the result. However, when we look at the connection between 1649 and 1689, they were connected to the contentious issue of limiting the king's power. At the time, the concept of "sovereignty" was still in its formative stages, but at the center of the debate was the question of individual rule and how to prevent it from tipping into tyranny, and this was carried on. This issue was settled with the establishment of the principle of a "king in parliament" through an honorary revolution. However, in the process, the principle of "Protector in Congress" was written into the codified constitution. Another inheritance was the Protestant succession to the throne, as well as the fact that, as Braddick noted, "the people" began to be incorporated into political resources. 


Mitani: How should we view the long revolution? Braddick proposed the interpretation of the English Revolution as one long revolution, and Wasserstrom suggested that we had better view the long revolution as a series of smaller revolutions. Of the two, the view of it as one long revolution tends to lead to an objectivist interpretation. I assume that Wasserstrom probably said this because the CCP now talks about the Chinese Revolution as the road to Communist Party victory, and he thought that a different narrative was needed. 

  The view of the Meiji Revolution as a series of short minor revolutions can also be used. I depicted the Revolution as a continuous process of 20 years, but even so, there were clear differences between before and after the Meiji government was formed. Also, in the comparative chart of violence and public opinion presented at the end of the keynote speech, each revolution, Chinese, French, British, and Russian, moved on a quadratic plane. The idea of a series of short, small revolutions fits well with this graph, and one would expect heuristic utility. The idea of one long revolution cannot be ruled out in principle, but it should be noted that this tends to justify the existing system, and would run the risk of deviating from the academic method of history. 


Ikeda: The long understanding of revolution tends to fall into objectivism. This point is connected to the question that Dr. Sakai posed yesterday as to what can be said to have accomplished a revolution. In the case of the Russian Revolution, it is said, "It was done to industrialize Russia, a backward country. It was a long revolution that lasted beyond 1917 until the 1930s and was accomplished through industrialization.” But revolutions, in general, seldom come to fruition as they are, even if the revolutionaries had a goal in mind. Rather, revolutions end up in unexpected places by chance, tangled relationships, and so on. That is what makes it interesting. Nevertheless, even though we must be wary of the objectivity of the idea of a long revolution, historical research also has the task of organizing the past from the present. If we can organize the past in textbooks by stating that, apart from the views of contemporaries, the revolution arrived at this point in time, and that this was the result of the revolution, our understanding of world history will be clearer. Such a division, on the other hand, may be necessary. 

  On the Succession of Revolution. Once the revolutionary regime is realized, the act of revolution itself is sanctified. The act of looking back to the origin begins. In the case of the French Revolution, the Third Republic came to share the French Revolution as its origin. The United States has always relied on the memory of its Revolution. The same may be true of Russia and China. Later politicians utilized the revolution as the basis for their legitimacy, and the masses accepted it. As Watanabe commented, the concept of revolution is a tricky one, and it is undesirable to trace the historical perceptions that legitimize a regime. In the case of long revolutions, we should examine them from the perspective of how their memory will be passed on. 


Yamazaki: In the case of the long revolution, attention should also be paid to the problem consciousness on the part of researchers. In the case of the French Revolution, the theory of bourgeois revolution was at its height in the 1950s, both in France and Japan. The basic historical movement was the transition of the economic system from medieval feudalism to capitalism, and it was understood, with an economic focus, that the ruling class was replaced by the modern bourgeoisie from the aristocracy of the Middle Ages, and that a struggle for hegemony took place at that time, which was the Modern Revolution. In the French Revolution, the monarchy was overthrown, the privileges of the aristocracy were taken away, citizens gained equal rights, and the bourgeoisie in effect gained political hegemony. Later, as capitalism developed, the nature of the bourgeoisie changed, and this was reflected in politics. The February Revolution and a group of small revolutions in 19th-century Europe are examples of this. Should we view a revolution as a sequence of individual small revolutions or as a coherent whole within the larger flow from feudalism to capitalism.? It is not a question of objective fact but of the researcher's awareness of the issues. 

  More recently, researchers have shifted their attention to political history rather than economic regimes. The republican system took hold, creating a society in which people respected each other's freedom. The French Revolution that began in 1989 became a republic in 1892, followed by the Napoleonic Empire, the Restoration of the Monarchy, the Constitutional Monarchy, and several revolutions, until finally, in the 1870s, the Third Republic was established and its framework has been followed up to the present. In this view, the period from the end of the 18th century to the 1870s is considered one long revolution that established the Republic. 


Sakai: From the standpoint of regional studies, I would like to ask a fundamental question. The discussion since yesterday has been interpreted from an outsider's point of view. However, I believe that the viewpoints and wording of the local parties involved are also important. What did they problematize, when did they call it "revolution" and when did they stop calling it so? Why did they use Western concepts? How should we translate them? 

  Long revolution, short revolution. This too will be important for the local people to recognize. Why did they keep calling it so repeatedly and when did they decide to stop? That is the only way to study the region. Then, can we make comparisons? From what standpoint is the study of comparative revolution possible? 


Ikeda: An anonymous question from the audience was directed to Dr. Watanabe. Since revolution is a transfer of power, isn't violence inevitable? 


Watanabe: Power is not a thing. Both the police and the military, which are known as organizations of violence, are organizations composed of people, not things. In both cases, subordinates are not forced to act by their superiors. Moreover, if the military changes its side, power can be overthrown without a drop of blood, and if it maintains neutrality, the government can be shaken even by a few demonstrations. The military, which appears to be the core of power, can also help in the transition of power, as long as it is an organization. 


Mitani: Violence was in fact inevitable even in the Meiji Revolution. However, the number of deaths was comparatively small. The motivation for organizing this study group was to see if violence could be reduced depending on human efforts, and how this could be achieved. Once, when I mentioned that there were few deaths during the Meiji Revolution, an eminent Japanese historian of Chinese history replied to me that Mao Zedong had said that revolutions are born from guns. I was so surprised that he was caught up in his expertise to doubt the basic facts of the revolution that took place in his country. Anyway, there are many levels of violence, of which the less violence the better. I think many would agree with that. To understand this, comparative studies are inevitably necessary. 

  One more matter. It was pointed out that the issue of freedom has not been discussed, but in this connection, I think a more serious question is how an illiberal regime emerged. If the monarchy is overthrown, the center of power will disappear. A replacement must be found. Individuals may rise to power, but the fashion of the 20th century was a party. A party with revolutionary aims comes to power. What will happen then? What I saw from Dr. Ishikawa's presentation yesterday was the perpetuation of harassment, by crushing individual personalities and placing them in a relationship of servitude. Then, unless the person in power dies, the system will continue. This was what happened in reality in the Soviet Union and China. In Japan today, the spell of a politician who was skilled at seizing people's hearts and minds seems to be continuing even after his death. The seizure of power by con men is a dangerous thing. Such a thing can happen anywhere, and it is important to try to prevent it beforehand. 


Ikeda: Mr. Goro Hashimoto in the audience suggested that more attention should be paid to the major reformers of the Meiji Revolution. 


Watanabe: They were members of the new government, i.e., lower-class samurai. People who had been dissatisfied with the hereditary system and had a Confucian education. Many of the townspeople and peasants stood idly by. 


Mitani: I am at a loss for an answer because my historical research has focused on the process, not the bearers. Yet, to add to Watanabe's answer on that, I think it was important to note that the samurai were people who despised money. They were people who could not, with some exceptions, use their power to make money. This was fortunate for modern Japan. Corruption was seen in the early days, but it gradually slipped away starting with the establishment of the Board of Audit in the 1880s. Japan has been quite spared corruption in the past two or three decades. It was a long, long process, but I don't know if this would have been possible without the samurai in the first place. 


Iwai: I would like to mention history education. In the heyday of Marxism, comparisons were required because of the need for theoretical requirements. Since the disappearance of grand theory, it has become difficult to compare revolutions. In the case of Japan, world history and Japanese history were divided in high school education, and from the Japanese history side, the perspective of comparing the Meiji Revolution with foreign revolutions did not emerge, and from the world history side, there was no intellectual environment to connect the British, American, and French revolutions with Japanese issues. However, with the establishment of the subject of ‘Modern and Contemporary History’ by the integration of the two, the Meiji Revolution was placed immediately after the French Revolution, but the two were not well jointed The Courses of Study link the two together under the framework of "Creation of a Nation," but teachers in the field say it is difficult to teach. We look forward to seeing how the work of long-term understanding and comparison of revolutions can contribute to solving this problem. 


Ishikawa: Since I am also studying Liang Qichao, I would like to comment on the "Liang Qichao Proposition" submitted by Dr Fukamachi. It is a proposition that democracy is impossible in China for the time being because the Chinese people are immature and must be educated. Liang Qichao published an interesting article on the word "revolution" in 1902 titled "Shakukaku" (釈革、i.e. interpreting the character ‘gé’). “Kakumei’(géming)" is a neologism invented by the Japanese, but it is not a good one. It is different from the Chinese Yi Shing revolution, a dynastic change, and the Western ”Revolution,” a major revolution. Yet, the Japanese use of the word to refer to the execution of the king in the French Revolution and other events has caused a great deal of misunderstanding in China. The focus of attention turned to the violent aspect, and the original aspect of great change was forgotten. On the contrary, he spoke highly of the Meiji Revolution, saying whenever Japanese people refer to the transition from Keio to Meiji, they call it a revolutionary era. Whenever they refer to projects such as the overthrow of the shogunate and the abolition of feudal domains, they call them revolutionary projects. Anyone who has visited Japan and read Japanese books know this. He judged the Meiji transformation to be a revolution of such magnitude that it rivaled that of 17th-century England or 18th-century France. The magnitude of the content of the transformation is the true meaning of "revolution," said one of China's leading intellectuals of the time. I have introduced this information for the reference of this study group. 


Ikeda: I would like to respond to Watanabe's discussion. Through our discussions thus far, we have come to believe that the conventional concept of "revolution" is inadequate and that its Western-centeredness must be overcome. Through the presentations and discussions of the past two days, I have felt the weight of the word "revolution". What are "authority," "power," and "legitimacy"? These fundamental concepts of human society are directly connected to "revolution.” In a revolution, a fundamental questioning of authority and power is conducted, and the structure of human society is illuminated quickly. Dr. Watanabe pointed out the possibility of military disobedience, but why do we usually obey? Why do they sometimes collapse during revolutions? I would like to reconsider. 


Mitani: Watanabe's arguments always challenge our common sense, and I was shaken to hear them again today. Thank you very much. First of all, regarding the concept of "revolution," I agree with your point that there are aspects we cannot see if we stick to the conventional concept and thus we forgot to see the German Revolution. As an alternative, he proposed "big rapid change," which can be understood as a change spanning political, social, and cultural spheres. Before, I could not understand the cultural and religious revolutions, but if I include them in the framework, I think I will be able to take the Iranian Revolution into account. In this scheme, Watanabe used English terms. Although they are expressed in a Western language, it is a good conceptualization because they have almost the same meaning in any language and in any country. Also, I think the model of Polyarchy, consisting of inclusiveness and tolerance of contestation, is reasonable and easy to use. However, the problem lies beyond. Why does each country follow a different trajectory on this conceptual scheme? It must be an issue for our future research. As for violence, I mentioned earlier. 

  What I found quite interesting in the presentations and discussions from yesterday was the typology of revolutions that Ikeda presented yesterday. The point was not the typology per se, but the point that each era has a different theme, which is shared throughout the world. Today, this global trend seems to be disappearing. Also, as a Revolution researcher, I have long wondered why a liberal system was established after the Meiji Revolution, but after hearing his point, I realized that Japan at that time was in the midst of British-led globalization. Half of the Meiji government leaders visited the United States and Europe, and after comparing the various countries, they thought that the United Kingdom seemed the best. Ikeda points out that the global context plays a major role in the course of the revolution. I would like to use it, as well as Dr. Watanabe's diagram, when I compile the collection of papers presented at this symposium. I would be grateful if you could continue to provide us with excellent conceptualizations. 


Ikeda: Let us conclude the roundtable. Thank you to the presenters, those who asked questions, the audience and online participants, and especially to the commentator Dr. Watanabe. 
















(1)「革命」という概念The concept of “Revolution”




 したがって、「儒教は宗教か」という問いは、結局、「儒教はキリスト教に、どこがどれくらい似ているのか」という問いと同じです。それ故、答えは、「儒教は宗教としては特異だ」とか、「不十分だ」とかいうことに、当然、なります。有名な例では、マックス・ヴェーバーが、『宗教社会学論集』Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie において、『儒教と道教』Konfuzianismus und Taoismus(Hans H. Gerth(tr.), The Religion of China, 1951)を論じて、儒教は、現世的で合理主義的で官僚制的だなどと書いていますが、初めから儒学をReligionだと決めつけて、プロテスタンティズムなどと比較するのですから、「Religionにしては、異常に現世的だ」などという結論になるに決まっているわけです。

ヨーロッパの概念を用いて、ヨーロッパの外の、アジアやアフリカの歴史・文化・社会を論じれば、大体、同じことになります。これまでアジア人自身によっても、散々なされてきました。日本の近代史についても、日本に、ブルジョアジーはいたのか、「市民社会」があったのか、「公共圏public sphere」があったのか、日本人に「近代的自我」があるのか、明治憲法は「擬似立憲君主制」にすぎないのではないか、そもそも日本のいわゆる近代化は真の意味での近代化と言えるのか等々、と議論されてきました。少なくとも数十年ほど前までは。








例えば、第一に、フース先生が昨日指摘されたように、ロシア革命の陰に隠れて、ドイツ革命はほとんど無視されているのではないでしょうか。20世紀初頭、工業や学問において世界最先端だったヨーロッパ中央の大国で起きた革命、そして当時、die größte aller Revolutionenあらゆる革命の内で最大の革命と呼ばれたにもかかわらず(cf. Robert Gerwarth, Die größte aller Revolutionen: November 1918 und der Aufbruch in eine neue Zeit, 2018、大久保里香ほか訳『史上最大の革命:1918年11月、ヴァイマル民主政の幕開け』みすず書房、2020年)、比較考察の対象にならない。僅かに、池田嘉郎先生の論文で、ひと言触れられている程度です。1918年の短いドイツ革命、あるいは1945年までの長いドイツ革命を視野に入れる必要はないでしょうか。





そこで、どうしてもフランス革命との連想が断ち切れない「革命」という言葉の使用を止めるということも、考えられるのではないでしょうか。例えば、第一に、急激な政治的大変動 big rapid political change、第二に、急激な社会的経済的大変動big rapid social change、そして第三に急激な文化的(宗教的)大変動big rapid cultural change、この三つの大変動の結合したものを「大変動」と呼ぶことにして、このシンポジウムも、大変動の比較シンポジウムとする。あるいは、副題にある「体制変革」を採って、体制変革の比較シンポジウムとしても良いかもしれません。









そこで参考になると思ったのは、現代政治学の基本のキである、20世紀後半のアメリカを代表する政治学者、Robert Dahl (1915-2014)の著、Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971)(高畠通敏ほか訳『ポリアーキー』岩波文庫、2014年)です。

ダールは、理念としての民主主義と区別して、現に人々の政治参加がかなりあり、同時に、政府に公然と異議申し立てができる政治体制をpolyarchyと名付けました。どちらもなく、人々がただ臣民subjectとして、政府に黙って服従する他無いという状態を出発点と考えると(図の左下隅です)、そこから公然たる異論の提出public contestationができる方向に進むと、自由な寡頭制liberal oligarchyになる。一方、public contestationが保障されないままに、人々が政治に包摂されていく、横軸に沿って右に進むとparticipationというよりは、国家への引き込み・動員mobilizationで、行く着くところはファシズム・全体主義、ソ連、共産中国、北朝鮮ということになる。両方が進むと、例えば、まず異論を堂々と述べられるoligarchyになり、そこから参政権が拡大されていって右に進む、そうなると通常理解される自由な民主政、polyarchyになっていく。


で、nationの形成は、この横軸のparticipationあるいはmobilizationに伴う事象ではないでしょうか。そこにおいてpublic contestation が可能かどうかで、それが普通にいう民主化になるか、抑圧的な全体主義的体制になるかが分かれる。



なお、逆に、そもそも主にnation-buildingという側面に着目することもできると思います。主体的に参加する国民に支えられた国家を作らないと国家間の生存競争に勝ち抜けないという状況認識の下、中央集権的な国民国家が19世紀から次々と建設されました。そこに着目すると、昨日フース先生が指摘されたように、1867年から71年にかけての日本の政治変革、1870年のイタリア統一、1871年のドイツ帝国成立は、同時的な、しかも類似した事件に見えて来ます。さらに、中国革命も含めることができるかもしれません。「革命」と普通呼ばれているかどうかではなく、このままではやられる、追いつかねばならないなどという強迫観念からするnation stateの形成とそれに伴う諸変革という概念で世界史を斬ってみるというのも良いのではないでしょうか。





















Wasserstrom:中国史を研究し始めたときよく話題にしていた問題で、昨日からの議論で欠けていたものがある。Revolution と rebellion の違いだ。Rebellion とは、体制はそのままに権力にある者を変えることで、太平天国を見ていた西洋人は、中国人は地上でもっとも rebellion を起しやすく、revolution を起しにくい人々だと観察していた。長い農民反乱の伝統がある一方、新たな王朝への傾向も見られた。今回の議論の中では、イギリスのuprising の箇所で、『動物農場』的な、新たな統治者が前の統治者とそっくりという状況への言及があった。アラブの春後のエジプトも同様だ。中国については『阿Q正伝』が、1911の革命は、地方の人民にとっては権力者の名前が変っただけに見えたと記している。

Revolution とは、新しい構造への変化に向うことと見て良いだろう。しかし、人々がその後、前進があったと人々が考えるか否かは別問題だ。明治維新の場合、天皇が権力の座に居続けたものの、明らかに新たな構造への前進が見られた。他方、フランス革命ではrestoration が起き、君主政に戻った。今回、rebellion が論じられなかったのには驚いた。


Cole:今日の議論を聴いていて、revolution と官僚・軍事組織の関係を考えた。前近代では、暴力に専従する集団があり、家系で世襲した。オスマン帝国のマムルークがその例である。オスマン帝国でも日本でも、近代の革命がこれら戦士カーストを瓦解させた。



後藤:イギリス史の研究史にはGreat rebellion という語がある。マルクス主義的な理解を批判する研究で最初に現れたのは「地方の大反乱」という議論で、1970年代に流行った。これはマルクス主義が注目する資源の再分配は起きなかったことを明らかとした。1990年代には理解が一転し、単なる大反乱ではなく、革命的な意義があったことをブリテンという枠の中で見出そうとした。その革命とは何か。大きな転換があった、それは nation 意識、文化的・社会的価値観の再定義、それらが「近代」を生み出したことだ。













鰐淵:Bellへの応答。アメリカ革命を typical revolution と解したのは、フランス革命やロシア革命に引寄せるという意図からではなく、暴力と公論の関係の推移、両者が同時に開いて最後は閉じるという運動のサイクルが他の革命と同様だった点に直目したからだ。やや不容易な使い方だったか。

朴薫は、維新を「なし崩し的革命」と呼んだが、これはアメリカ革命やフランス革命、ないしイギリス革命にもよく当てはまる。アメリカでは、当初は君主政の下で課税の中止を求め、ついで妥協点として連合帝国体制を創ろうとしたが、それも拒否されたので独立に向った。Gradual な動きであって、20世紀のように、初めに goal を掲げて始めたものとは全く異なる。当時の革命は、最終目的なしに始ったのがむしろ典型的だったのではないか。













朴薫 最初にこの会議全体に対し、二点、申します。革命と公論、革命と暴力、革命と戦争という論点はあったが、革命と自由という問題提起はなかった。今日ようやく、塩出報告と渡辺コメントで出てきた。日本でなぜ政治的自由が可能になったのかという点で、塩出は罪刑法定主義の存在と答えた。池田のソヴェト的公共圏とか石川の歯車として生きる革命家の生き方という問題とも連関するが、革命における自由の抑圧をどう評価し、位置づけるべきか。政治的価値判断のリスクを冒しながらも、議論すべきではないか。法治、自由を抑える革命をどう評価すべきか。現在、リベラル体制の危機が問題化しているが、いまこそ、これを問うべきではないか。

もう一つ気になるのは、韓国革命という概念が存在しないこと。北朝鮮には革命はあったと思われているが。19世紀以来、百年を超える韓国の歴史を考えると、これを革命と呼ばないならどこに革命があると言えるだろうか。渡辺先生が取上げた三つの側面、政治・社会・文化すべてで大きな変化があった。革命でなくて、体制転換とか、big rapid changes と呼ぶなら、明らかにその中に入る。他にもインドも考察対象とすべきだろう。







































もう一件。自由の問題が議論されていないとの指摘があったが、その関連では、不自由な体制がどのようにしてできるのかという方が深刻な問題と思う。君主政を打倒すると権力の中心がなくなる。代りを探さねばならない。個人が台頭することもあるが、20世紀の流行は party だった。革命を目的とするパーティが権力を握る。すると何が起きるか。昨日の石川先生の発表から見えたのは、ハラスメントの恒常化、個々人の人格を砕き、隷従の関係に置く。そうなると、その権力者が死なない限り、その体制は続く。これが、ソ連や中国で現実に起きたことだった。今の日本でも、人心掌握に長けた政治家の呪縛が続いているように見える。ペテン師による権力掌握は危険なことだ。こうしたことはどこでも起きることで、予めそれを防ぐ努力は大事なのではないだろうか。














三谷:渡辺の議論は、いつも我々の常識に挑戦するもので、今日もまた伺ってあたふたした。ありがとうございます。まず、「革命」の概念だが、従来の概念に拘っていては見えないものがある、ヨーロッパ史でもドイツ革命が見えなくなるという指摘にはなるほどと納得した。代案として出されたbig rapid change では、それを政治・社会・文化の三つの領域に跨る変化として理解する図式が提出された。そのうち、私は従来、文化、宗教をめぐる革命をうまく理解できなかったが、これを枠の中に入れると、イラン革命までうまく視野に取込むことができると思う。この図式の中で、渡辺は英語を使った、これらは、どの言語、どの国でもほぼ同じ意味をもつので、うまい概念化だ。また、ポリアーキイについては、inclusiveness と contestation の許容とからできたこの図式も妥当で使いやすいと思う。ただ、問題はその先にあって、なぜ各国がこの平面上でそれぞれ異なる軌跡を辿ったのか、我々のこれからの研究課題と思う。暴力に関しては先に触れたとおり。




第8回 ワークショップ 

2022年11月5日 10:00-12:30 

東洋文庫 + zoomオンライン (ハイブリッド)

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■ 参加者  [*オンライン参加] 

研究代表者:三谷 博


研究協力者:岩井淳*、山崎耕一*、早川理穂 、朴薫* 







三谷:廃藩や脱身分化という激変がどうしてミニマムの犠牲で済んだかという基本問題 に、東アジアの伝統的概念の応用法から迫った斬新な発表と思う。ただ、これを国際研究会に出す場合、「封建」や「郡県」という概念をどう訳せば東アジア以外の人に理解してもらえるかという難題もある。





















発表(2)早川理穂「フランス革命における戒厳令と民衆の暴力(The Martial Law and Popular Violence n the French Revolution)」

  フランス革命初期の1789年10月21日、民衆騒擾の鎮圧を目的とする戒厳令が、イギリスの騒擾令 Riot Act(1715年)を参照しつつ制定された。食糧不足・価格高騰を背景としてパリでパン屋の殺人が起こったため、戒厳令制定が早められたが、民衆騒擾を取り締まる法律の必要性は1789年夏頃にはすでに国民議会で議論され、8月10日には市の要請により民兵、騎馬警察隊、軍が暴徒を解散させる法律が制定されている。














第7回 ワークショップ 

2022年10月8日 10:00-12:30 

東洋文庫 + zoomオンライン (ハイブリッド)

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■ 参加者  [*オンライン参加] 

研究代表者:三谷 博


研究協力者:岩井淳、山崎耕一*、早川理穂 、朴薫*、Harald Fuess* 



発表: 後藤はる美「近世イギリスおよびアイルランドにおける暴力・正当性・初期公共圏(Viorence, Legitimacy and the Early Public Sphere in Early Modern Britain and Ireland)」





その理解に、Keith Baker, Dan Edelstein, Scripting revolution を使ってはどうか。  「後世に革命として参照されたもの」として、比較の補助線に使えるのでは。 




①犠牲者数:暴力の代表的指数。総論で、Clodfelter を出発点に比較提示。 




1. 1946年革命と1688年革命―「ペンは剣よりも強し」? 

  犠牲者数については、Charles Carlton, The seat of mars (2011) が信頼できるデータを提出している。三王国戦争での犠牲者は English 23万+ Scots/Irish 42万≒65万とされる。うち Ireland での人口比は20%と激甚であった。名誉革命は England では無血革命かも知れないが、Scots/Irish の犠牲は11万に上る。これはそもそもオランダ総督による invasion から始った。言論の勝利とは言えない。ただし、「長いイギリス革命」という視点からすると、長期の内戦による疲弊と戦争忌避感は重視すべきだろう。 

2. 暴力と革命―アイルランド 



3. 国王裁判―大逆者チャールズ・ステュアート 


























岩井:イギリスの場合、戦争や暴力の浸透は、イングランド、スコットランド 、アイルランドという国民ごとに別々に考える必要があるだろう。 





酒井:革命を Script の変奏と視るアプローチには魅力がある。中東ではヨーロッパの革命を常に意識していた。他方、革命の定義を体制転換や民主化に求める場合、20世紀の途上国でみられた左派革命では革命が自己目的化していく「終わらない革命」はどう理解するべきなのか? 


三谷:革命を 西洋でできたscript の変奏として理解すると、明治維新が完全に埒外におかれ、イラン革命も外れてしまう。我々の研究は、欧米モデルの無効(とくに20世紀の革命で)という認識から出発するので、使わない方がよいだろう。後発革命が先行革命をどう参照したか、何を無視し、誤解し、変形したかは重要なテーマで、それ自体として研究すべきではある。






第6回 ワークショップ 

2022年6月4日 13:30-16:30 

東洋文庫 + zoomオンライン (ハイブリッド)

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■ 参加者  [*オンライン参加] 

研究代表者:三谷 博


研究協力者:岩井淳、山崎耕一、早川理穂 、朴薫*


発表: 塩出浩之「比較革命史上における明治維新と新聞」 










岩井:イギリス革命でも、検閲廃止により党派ごとの新聞が発行されたが、それが革命を創り出したとまでは言えない。パンフレットや印刷物は以前から多く流通し、革命の素地を創った。それらは、検閲回避のため、多くはオランダで印刷発行したものが輸入された。アメリカ革命でも、ロンドンで刊行されたものが移民と一緒にアメリカに持ち込まれた。Pamphlet war という語があるように、印刷物は公論の形成に大きな役割を果たした。質問が二つある。第1に、瓦版について、近世と近代の連続と断絶はどうだったか。印刷方法はどうだったか。第2に、新聞統制に当たって西洋のどの国をモデルにしたのか。


後藤:17世紀イギリスでは、定期刊行物がないので、パンフレットと新聞とに差がなく、印刷物と一般的に呼んでいる。その流通量は1641年の前後で激変した。が、1649年の革命までには年月が短く、印刷物が革命を準備したとまでは言えないだろう。しかし、印刷物を使って展開し、とくに非対面的な政治コミュニケーションにより政治参加者の拡大を可能にしたのは間違いない。People の登場を準備した。王政復古期には検閲制度が復帰したが、度々の議会解散によって失効し、また paper war が起きた。それは戦争を起こしたわけでなかったが、ねつ造記事が政治裁判を生み、大逆罪により処刑される者が多発して、亡命者も出た。その教訓から名誉革命後は大逆法が改正され、司法による殺人はなくなった。その一方、検閲法も1695年には撤廃された。統制が効かないことが分かったからである。「法の支配」はこうして形成されたのだが、それは言論の自由があったからではなく、直前にこうした弾圧の時代があったからである。他方、最近よく議論されるのは、言論の自由は商業的出版の成立が前提となっているという点。それは新体制の目指すものと同じく、重要な要因だろう。

















第3回 国際研究会



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概要: 第3回国際会議は東アジアとヨーロッパのメンバーの会議で、フランス革命について発表・討論を行った後、主に比較の方法について討論を行った。 

■ 参加者(以下、敬称略)




海外研究協力者:Michael Braddick, Harald Fuess





Taira Masato,‘French Revolution from the perspective of the conflict between Public opinion and Violence: The “Bureau Politique” and the “primary and electoral assemblies” of the Second Directory’ 

要旨 今回の研究報告の目的は以下の三点である。

  第一に、第一回国際研究会(2020年12月19日)におけるDavid A. Bell氏の報告 (‘The ‘Queen of the World’ and the ‘Volcano of the People’: Pen and Sword in the French Revolution’)は、フランス革命の展開を世論と暴力の相互関係という観点から捉え直し、それらの関わり合いから革命そのものの意味が変化していくプロセスを明らかにした。だが、ベル氏の主たる分析対象は1789年から1794年までの革命であった。これに対して、本報告は、伝統的なフランス革命史研究においてある種の「弱点」とされてきた1795年以降の総裁政府 (the Directory) 期を分析対象とし、この時期における革命の展開を再評価することで、一方では、フランス革命の10年を一貫した連続性を内包する歴史としてとらえ直し、他方では、フランス革命後の時代・社会におよぼした総裁政府期に固有な経験に光を当てることができると考える。


  第三に、世論という観点から総裁政府期の暴力に接近するにあたっては、この時期に新たな政治闘争の手段・空間として出現した選挙に着目する。総裁政府期の選挙は、政府共和派を軸として、右派と左派からなる三つ巴の様相を呈しており、熾烈な選挙戦を繰り広げていた。組織的な選挙妨害も数多く発生し、「選挙集会の分裂」 は革命期全般を通じて発生していたと言われているが、1798年の選挙ではその発生件数が急増した。本報告では、総裁政府期の選挙集会の分裂が非合法な暴力として作りあげられていくプロセスを、政府機関である「政治局」の選挙キャンペーンのなかに探し求める。そこには、フランス革命における暴力の新たな一面が浮かびあがるとともに、そこにみえてくる暴力と世論の関係性は、フランス革命後の時代・社会にも大きな影響をおよぼすものと考えられる。



池田(指定討論者):平報告は、総裁政府期における選挙に焦点を当てて、公論と暴力の問題を検討した。扱った時期も、主題も、私たちの共同研究にとって独自の意義をもつ。総裁政府期がわれわれの主題である「ペンと剣」にとって特別な関心を引くとすれば、それは革命の馴致という課題がそこで大きな問題となっていたからである。1794年7月のテルミドールのクーデタ(the coup of Thermidor)は、フランス革命の急進化局面を終わらせた。だが、テルミドール派および総裁政府は、フランス革命そのものを終わらせようとしていたのではない。革命の理念を引き継ぎながら、革命政治を安定させようとしていたのである。Andrew Jainchillによれば、そのために総裁政府がもっとも重視したのはmoeurs(生活様式)であった。国家が主導して、人々の生活様式を変えていき、公共の徳を実現しようとしたのである。このために国家が用いたのは、教育、検閲、そして祭典であった。テルミドール派(the Thermidorians)・総裁政府は、有産市民を主体とする共和政の確立に力を注いだ。それゆえ、一定の教育レベルをもつ、有産市民とその子弟が、総裁政府による働きかけの主要な対象となったのである。とくに教育がそうだったわけであるが、検閲もまた言論空間を単に規制するだけではなく、あるべき徳や共和政の形を積極的に発信することで、一定の教育レベルにある人々の内面に働きかけようとしたのだといえる。

  このように考えると、平報告は二つの点で注目に値する。第一に、選挙を、総裁政府による政治と国民との接点として取り上げたことである。教育、検閲、祭典というJainchillが注目する手段とは別に、選挙が市民の政治啓蒙の装置として重要であることは疑いない。その際、平報告は、選挙妨害という事象を取り上げることによって、国家から市民への働きかけを見るだけではなく、それに対する市民の側からの応答(抵抗や無視を含む)にも光を当てているのである。第二に、平報告が興味深いのは、選挙妨害を暴力というカテゴリーにあてはめて取り上げていることである。選挙妨害という規模においても参加者においても限定的な暴力は、テルミドール・クーデタ後のフランスにおける、革命の馴致という課題の本質を、よく表している。住民のエネルギーを、いかにして規制された回路へと誘導し、脱暴力化するかが、革命プロセスにおいては必ずどこかで必要になってくる(ソ連の異論派(dissident)の歴史家ゲフテル(Gefter)は、レーニンが急進的な戦時共産主義(the War Communism)から混合経済の新経済政策(the New Economic Policy)に転換したことを、「自己テルミドール化」(self-Thermidorizing) と呼んで肯定的に評価した)。総裁政府にとって選挙もまた、暴力の限定化された発露の場となることによって、革命馴致の手段という機能を果たしていたと考えることができるのである。

  平報告への質問を出したい。総裁政府期における対外戦争は、ボナパルト(Bonaparte)の台頭に示されるように、政治における軍人の存在感を増したように思われる。この軍人の役割の増大は、総裁政府期の政治文化(political culture)に、どのような影響を与えたのだろうか。これが私の質問である。

  総じて総裁政府は、革命の研究史において長く不遇であった(ロシア革命における臨時政府(the Provisional Government)とよく似ている)。つまり、英雄的な、あるいは悲劇的な、国民公会およびボナパルトの影に隠れていたわけである。しかし、革命の安定化を果たすという点からは、総裁政府は、とくにフリュクチドール・クーデタ(the coup of Fructidor)により王党派(royalists)議員を排除したあとは、中央権力の強化のために、いくつもの仕事を成し遂げた。テルミドール・クーデタから総裁政府をへて統領政府(the Consulate)にいたる過程は(第一帝政(the First Empire)・復古王政(the Restoration)を加えてもよい)、革命の安定化という一般的な課題を果たすための大きな局面をなしていたのであり、総裁政府はその重要な一環であった。とくに警察・憲兵(the gendarmarie)機構の整備、刑事犯に対する罰則強化によって、民衆社会の間に広がった暴力を押さえ込み、一元的な暴力の担い手としての国家の再確立に尽くした点は、強調すべきである(Goodwinがすでに1937年に明記している)。

  最後に、われわれの共同研究において、「公論と暴力」という問題に関して、今後考察すべき論点を二つあげておきたい。まず、政治において、暴力が徐々に馴致されて、公論が対立を調整するために中心的な役割を果たすようになるというのが、名誉革命(the Glorious Revolution)後のイギリス、独立革命(the American Revolution)後のアメリカ合衆国、明治維新(the Meiji Revolution)後の日本などに共通する、一つのパターンであるといえるだろう。問題は、この過程において確立される「公論」は、それ自体として抑圧的な要素を含むことはないのかということである。総裁政府が発信する言説の特徴としてJainchillは、公私の一体化を追求していたことを挙げている。一般意思(the general will)を重視するルソーの思想から考えればこれは自然のことであるが、総じて啓蒙や徳や共和政といったフランス革命の理念がはらむある種の抑圧性―スターリニズムとも時に関連付けられるような―については、あらためて注意しておきたい。また、Jainchillは、総裁政府の言説がすぐれてミソジニックであったことにも注意を向けている。女性は徳を腐敗させるものとして政治の場から排除され、その生活様式においては貞節が求められた(男性には求められなかった)。革命の公論におけるジェンダーについて、本研究会ではまだ本格的に議論していないが、見落としてはいけない問題である。



・A. Goodwin, “The French Executive Directory: A Revaluation”, History. 1937. 22-87

・Andrew Jainchill, Reimaging Politics after the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), Ch. 2. The Post-Terror Discourse of Moeurs












平:いまデータがない。政府側の資料には反対派の選挙妨害を指してviolence という言葉が頻出する。それが相手を貶めるレトリックなのかを含め、いまのところ実態はわからない。

Braddick: イギリスでも近世での投票率は低かった。選挙への参加者より投票者は少なかった。Open vote と言って、選挙集会で拍手で選出するという場合もあったので、投票数を数えることには限界がある。当時流布した印刷物はシェアして読まれたこともあって、口頭文化と密接な関係にあった。また、イギリスでは選挙での暴力は控えめだった。選挙妨害はあったが、どの候補を選ぶかという問題で手続き自体を変えようとの試みはなかった。18世紀の暴力はその点で1640年代のそれとは異なっていた。当時は暴力と争論は統合された形で存在しており、両者が正面から対立することはなかった。




Braddick: 一つの方法は深刻さに加えて、目的で区別すること。昨年1月のアメリカで起きた議会襲撃は革命的な暴力、憲法秩序(国制の規範)に対する挑戦だった。身体への犠牲はなかったが、これは暴力と呼べるのではないか。



早川:暴力の主体とヴェクトル。民衆の? 国家の? 誰の誰に対する暴力かを分けて考えるべきかどうか。公論と世論との差異も大事。ジャーナリズムの公論と別に、多数意見としての世論があり、後者には無文字の民衆が抱くものもある。フランス革命ではジャーナリズムと暴力の主体が分かれていた。アメリカでは元は一致していたのが、暴力から公論に移っていったようだが。 


司会:深町英夫、問題提起:Michael Braddick、記録:早川理穂

Michael Braddick, ‘Some thoughts on the state, legitimacy, violence, the public sphere and revolution’ 



























* 録画、および同時通訳の録音を行った。 

The 2nd International Meeting

January 7, 2022

9:00-13:00(JST),  January 6, 19:00-23:00 (EST) 

on Zoom 

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■The participants  

Project Leader: Hiroshi Mitani 

Partners: David Bell, Juan Cole, Mellisa Stockdale, 
Hideo Fukamachi, Harumi Goto, Riho Hayakawa, Hun Park,
Yoshiro Ikeda, Jun Iwai, Keiko Sakai, Shuichi Wanibuchi,
Koichi Yamazaki, Hiroyuki Shiode
Guest: Mio Kishimoto
Office work: Mie Shikano
Interpreter: Simul International 

Brief self-introduction by the participants

The second international meeting was held between East Asian and North American members. The themes were a trial platform for the comparison of revolutions, Russian revolution and Iranian revolution. After a brief conversation about recent history, the first session started. 

■The first session (A platform of comparison) 

Chair: Yoshiro Ikeda 

Presentation: Hiroshi Mitani, ‘A Basic Argument for the Comparison of Revolutions’ (read by Shuichi Wanibuchi on account of Mitani’s voice failure) 

   This paper is to provide a trial platform to compare eight revolutions occurred in very different time and space. Mitani first argued the definition of revolution in terms of duration and proposed both short and long perspectives were important. To show the usefulness of long-term perspective, he presented a word ‘backstop’ to grasp how the achievements of revolutions were secured. Then, he tried to visualize the relationships among polity change, public speech and violence by three charts. He created an ordinal scale for polity change that distinguished five degrees. As for freedom of public speech, he adopted the existence of censorship and its strictness and distinguished four grades. To estimate the degree of violence, he integrated the numbers of casualty that following book presented: Micheal Clodfelter, ‘Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015.’ Then, he drew three charts to show the relationships between polity change, public speech and violence and mapped each revolution according to the relative degree of population. 

   Finally, he showed a brief analysis of Meiji Revolution as an example. The revolution took about 20 years, from 1858 to 1877. Major reforms occurred during the latter ten years after the imperial restoration including polity change from double-headed federation to single headed monolithic state and the abolition of hereditary status system. During the former half, there were little polity change, no prints on sale and relatively low degree of violence. Yet, radical reforms after the imperial restoration were impossible without criticism to existing central government and continued negotiation for political participation during the ten years of Tokugawa rule. As for the death toll of the revolution, Mitani estimated it about 31,610 based on the list of victims published by Tetsuo Akeda and other reliable sources. Then, he analyzed the trajectory of the relationship between public speech and violence. Like other revolutions, public speech and violence emerged hand in hand in 1858, the beginning of political turmoil. Yet, their roles suddenly made a leap during the civil war in 1868 when newspapers emerged for the first time as another means of the battle. While violence stooped after the civil war, circulation of newspapers steadily increased to form an influential public sphere in cooperation with newly imported media of public speech. The crackdown of the Kagoshima rebellion became the watershed. Opposition parties abandoned violence and started to compete with the government only by newspapers and public speech. In Japan, the separation of public speech from violence occurred in its early stage.


Bell: It is an old and tricky question to compare revolutions. First, we have to define what is a revolution. What events can we include in that heading? What elements govern the outbreak and the course of revolutions. Are there any patterns that repeat in revolutions? The first scholar who dealt this issue was Crane Brinton in 1938. He compared English, American, French and Russian revolutions and identified a basic life-cycle which all four followed. A few decades later, social scientists such as Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol and Jack Goldstone published notable books that focused on the structural conditions of revolutions in reference to Marxist theory. Today, few historians continue to engage in comparative studies. One exception is Steve Pincus who wrote on the Glorious Revolution of 1688 who devised a model of revolution as a result of competing projects of political and economic modernization. Another exception is a group of historians of political culture who focus on the scripts of revolutions that were forged as variations of Anglo-American and French revolutions. Its most important contribution was the book Scripting Revolution, edited by Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein. 

   Mitani’s model is different from these earlier works. He concerns mainly on the differences rather than uniformities among revolutions. Also, he focusses on the courses and the human damage accompanied rather than the condition of outbreak. He is more of a social scientist, seeing revolution as a timeless category in contrast to the Baker-Edelstein model that puts emphasis on chronology and the efforts to modify previous scripts in successive revolutions. Within each of eight revolutions, Mitani seeks to identify three variables, each of which ideally can be quantified and mapped out. Can we detect common patterns in the way these variables develop and interact with each other across the life cycle of the different revolutions? Mitani’s attempt is very ambitious and tricky. It is not easy to measure these three variables. It is all the more difficult because it is inescapably connected to the political standpoint of the analyst, especially in selecting the events to be taken into account. Let me explain these difficulties from French revolution. 

   How to measure the extent of violence? Is it proper to include the immense human toll in the Napoleonic wars into the overall toll of French revolution? While conservative critics include it, supporters of the Revolution place it in a separate category. It is not easy to measure the extent of the freedom of speech and publication. Although the censorship of the Old Regime was abolished in 1789, National Assembly established a new crime lèse-nation and utilized it to close newspapers or arrest the members of the Assembly. During the Reign of Terror of 1793-94 it became heavy-handed. Here also, we can see the political cleavage between conservatives and supporters of the Revolution. Overall regime change might seem the easiest. The French revolution destroyed the formal system of government under monarchy. Yet, family structures, property ownership and certain legal forms remained as before. And, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, the French of 1750 and 1850 seemed to stretch out their hands to grasp each other over the gulf of the Revolution. The cleavage here lies between the camp who stresses the extent of change, both strong supporters and strong critics of the Revolution, and more moderate, liberal observers like Tocqueville and François Furet who paid more attention to the continuities. 

    My aim is not to say it impossible to construct this sort of model. I just want to underline the potential difficulties, and to emphasize the need for reading as widely and as judiciously as possible. I would also like to suggest it is important to define the variables themselves as carefully and precisely as possible. As for the category of violence, it is better to limit to internal violence by excluding foreign wars. It is similar to exclude the death toll by Japanese invasion in Chinese revolution and the death toll by Nazi in Russian revolution. 


Mitani: Thanks for detailed discussion. My aim is to compare eight, very different revolutions on the same arithmetic basis. After measuring these by three general criteria, I found Japan’s Meiji revolution was quite different from others. Utilizing this platform, I think we can also find the characteristics of each revolution. As for the measurement, I am concerned about the victims of famine caused by revolutions. Shall we include it or not? At least, we had better to estimate it in a separate category first. 


Sakai: Mitani’s table and charts show the variables of so-called Arab Spring in one regional category. The state of these countries were quite different. If we include Syria and Yemen, the casualties must leap sharply. Yemen’s death toll must vary depending on the inclusion of the civil war since 2015. It is crucial to decide what events should be included or not. As for the population, it is better not to integrate national populations into a regional one. And, in the Middle East and other Asian countries, Western intervention played an important role. So, we have to examine if we include foreign wars or not. 


Mitani: Yes, indeed. I will break the numbers with respect to each country: Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. I think it necessary to include the casualty by foreign wars. After starting this project, I found the Meiji revolution occurred within a very isolated environment. In contrast to European and Middle Eastern revolutions, Meiji revolution experienced almost no foreign interventions, especially form neighboring dynasties. Japanese at that time could indulge in domestic negotiations for more than ten years. I think it one of the major factors for Japan to escape from much bloodshed. So, I think it necessary to include the numbers of foreign wars for the comparative study of revolutions. 


Bell: It is tricky and difficult indeed. I think it depends on how we define wars as a part of revolution. Were the wars an integral part of revolution? Were they fought in order to export revolution? Or, were they purely defensive wars? We have to pay close attention when we include foreign wars, so as to avoid distortion. For example, was the Glorious Revolution of 1688 really “bloodless”? In fact, the bloodiest time of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 were the nine years war from 1688 to 1697 fought on Ireland and the Continent against France. It might be a good idea here to include the War of Spanish Succession as well. Yet, I think it better to exclude foreign wars to make comparison clearer. 


Mitani: I will re-estimate the numbers separately and present them for further discussion. 


Ikeda: I think Professor Mitani wishes to find the place of the Meiji revolution by global comparative studies. It was custom to regard the revolution as a minor event in Asia. Yet, it brought about the abolition of samurai class that had governed Japan for several hundred years with little sacrifice. This background may illuminate the contribution of his paper. 


Fukamachi: I agree with Professor Bell’s arguments. Here are two points to be considered. As for the foreign wars, I think they should be handled case by case. For Turkish revolution in 1920s, foreign wars against Western powers were integral part. In contrast, for Chinese revolution, Japanese invasion was not inherent part of it. My second point is the need for separating the sacrifices in time. It is better to distinguish the years of revolution and the years after the establishment of a new regime. In Russia and China, the sacrifice after the revolution was much higher than that during the revolution. In addition, we had better to pay more attention to the difference after the revolutions. Russia and China established quite different regimes from that of Japan after their revolutions. 

■The second session (Russian revolution)

Chair: Harumi Goto

Presentation:  Yoshiro Ikeda ‘The notion of citizens in the Russian revolutionary discourse from February 1917 to October 1918’ 

   This paper aims at analyzing the battle of discourses by various political agents focusing the word ‘citizen, Grazhdanin in Russian’ during the Russian revolution. 

   Beginning from the February revolution in 1917, the provisional government led by liberal politicians, KADET, Constitutional Democratic Party, at the center, tried to integrate all inhabitants in Russia as an egalitarian citizen with equal rights. Both liberals and socialists make their efforts to illuminate people to become a citizen who are willing to comply laws and to express their political will. Yet, socialists prefer the notion of ‘comrades’ to ‘citizen.’ As the social strains became harder, ‘citizen’ tuned into the symbol that represented political disruption. Socialists used the word as ‘non-comrade’ to exclude liberals, while Kadet tried to resist socialists utilizing ‘citizen’ as a keyword. Yet, Bolshevik after coming into power utilize the word in order to make people to observe discipline. 

   By this presentation, I would like to point out three observations. First, the emergence of public sphere does not always mitigate the political struggles, but often intensify them. Second, there is always the gap between the political concept like ‘citizen’ and the social reality and it provides the room for political compromise. Third, the ideology of enlightenment brought about horrible violence in some revolutions, especially in the twenties century. 


Stockdale: I appreciate Ikeda’s paper that proved the fact that various political parties used the concept ‘citizen’ in different ways based on original materials and the studies by Boris Kolonitskii and Orlando Figes. I would like to present three questions to develop our study. First, I wonder the relationship of the word ‘citizen’ and the WW1. It might be possible that discriminated people began to demand ‘citizenship’ in return for their contribution and sacrifice during the war. Second, there are studies that attribute the reason of local peasants’ refusal of ‘citizenship’ not to their inability of understanding the ‘civic obligation’ but to their discontent with governmental demand of obligation before enjoying their rights. What is your opinion? Third, when did the Russian revolution end? This paper ends it in 1918 in spite of common understanding that sees the end in early 1920s. I would like ask how the concept ‘citizen’ was understood and utilized during the civil war, Especially, how did non-Russians in ethnicity understand the concept? It seems important to understand their attitude because anti-Bolshevik movements was powerful in the non-urban, border zones. How did the concept develop itself after the end of the revolution? 


Ikeda: As for the second point, I cannot give a solid argument about the peasants’ use of ‘citizen’ because this paper does not analyze the situation in rural area. Yet, I suppose peasants were not ignorant. As for the third point, it is also difficult to analyze the situation because of the lack of historical material in these areas. Yet, it was critical to the course of the revolution. Non-socialist and Russian army were not always anti-revolutionary. The army acknowledged democratization while supporting some social hierarches. Modernity and conservatism were intermingled in their attitude. As for the first point, this presentation concentrates on the revolutionary situation focusing on the autonomy of revolutionary discourse, taking the concept of ‘citizen’ as an example, referring the works by Lyn Hunt and Kolonitskii. I think it difficult to take WW1 into account to the study of Russian revolution. It seemed to be an independent factor that should be separated from the revolution and civil war. As for the end of the revolution, I think it was early 1920s, even though it is difficult to specify the year. At least, Stalinist regime should be excluded. This implies the criticism to Mitani’s table and chart that presented Stalinist years in them. 


Cole: French people used the concept ‘citoyen’ in French revolution. What do you understand the relationships between French revolution and Russian revolution? 

Ikeda: Russian word ‘Grazhdanin’ meant the inhabitants of cities. Revolutionaries used the word in the same meaning as ‘citoyen’ strongly influenced by the French revolution. Yet, for ordinary people, the term just meant “inhabitants of the cities”. The revolutionaries tried to make their interpretation of the word dominant in the revolutionary Russia. 


Bell: Kolonitskii pointed out the Russian provisional government intentionally imitated French revolution. I think the word ‘Grazhdanin’ was also imported from French revolution. 


Ikeda: I will provide another paper on this subject. I think it important to find the model or scenario in each revolution, such as precedent revolutions, the holy bible, ancient Rome, etc., I think it necessary to investigate in the scenario of Meiji revolution, the influence of Asian tradition, Shinto and Buddhism. 


Mitani: There was no concrete model in the Meiji revolution at least in its early stage. (Most people referred to the end stage of Chinese dynasties and to the royalists in medieval Japan. Yet, there was no scenario in this revolution, at least in its early stage. (What the revolution realized was the demolition of aristocracy by an emperor. In this revolution, the process itself created a new model, a regime based on public discussion under the authority of the emperor, during ten years of slow, numberless political negotiation. Only after the establishment of the new government, they moved to adopt contemporary model of Western constitutional monarchy.) It is not proper to understand later revolutions from the model or scenario of precedented revolutions. Such approach will make it impossible to understand various revolutions in global scale. As for the dead under Stalin, is it possible to include the death toll by Agricultural collectivization after 1928? 


Ikeda: I am suspicious of including the death toll by famine. We should see Russian revolution ended in early 1920s. 

The third session (Iranian revolution)
Chair: Hideo Fukamachi 

Presentation: Juan Cole, ‘Keddie, Skocpol, Foucault: The Academy and the Comtean Shock of the Islamic Revolution, 1978-1979’

   This paper focuses on various interpretations of Iranian revolution by contemporary scholars. It is because our access to primary archival sources is so far limited. 

   Before the Iranian revolution, scholars tended to conceptualize a revolution to be progressive, or separate from religions, under the influence of Marxism and socialism. The 1978 revolution of Iran, already one of the modern states, basically aimed at the implementation of Islam as a political ideology. Although contemporaries refused to see it as a revolution at first, they began to include it into this category as an exceptional case. 

   Let me explain a brief sketch of the revolution. Around 1950, Iranian people became very dissatisfied toward the fact that the country’s oil receipts were benefiting Britain more than Iran. The ascendancy of PM Mohammad Mosaddegh saw oil nationalization and the fleeing of the Shah to Italy. The 1953 CIA coup reversed all this and allowed the Shah to return.  Many in Europe and North America welcomed the return of the Shah in 1953. From abroad, he was seen as an ‘enlightened monarch’ who promoted economic development, literacy, education and the expansion of women’s rights in cooperation with Western nations and various international organizations. Yet, domestically, people saw a different picture. The rise of oil prices increased national income. Yet, it only benefitted wealthy people with strong ties to the Shar. As industrialization developed, peasants migrated to towns to become poor laborers. At first, the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi pursued the ‘White revolution.’ The White revolution little benefited to most of them. As the Shah’s government became autocratic, people regard it as a puppet of the US. When workers and the lower middle class among townspeople began protesting against him, his secret police suppressed them by force, making some martyrs. People began gathering for Islamic commemorative ceremony of the victims. This ignited the chain of demonstrations in other cities and provoked a large-scale demonstration in Teheran that caused the economy to ground to a halt. The Shah fled abroad. On the other hand, Rūhollāh Khomeinī came back from his exile, which had been provoked by his opposition to the White revolution. He believed that ulamā, scholars of Muslim laws, should govern Muslim community because of the absence of the 12th imam who was the only just ruler in Shīa Islamic thought. Although he thought this interpretation traditional, historians understand it as an original idea by Khomeini. 

   Then, I would like to introduce various understandings of this revolution. The first is the view of Nikki Keddie, who was a mentor of mine. Under the shah, large businesses controlled the Iranian economy that invested much money in big banks and a steel mill without any deliberate plans. At the same time, they showed hatred to traditional merchants in bazaars and neglected small peasants. Keddie specified the cause of revolution as, not overly rapid modernization but the inequality in the distribution of the national income, which profited only a part of white-collar upper classes. She believed that the revolution was ignited by guerrilla attacks by some radicals that denounced the social strains caused by massive migration of peasants into cities. I myself evaluate the weight of the guerrilla groups as smaller. 

    The second is Theda Skocpol’s view. She started from the structural analysis of the relationships among the state, landowners and peasants. Revolution occurred when the state lost the power to oppress peasants who had permanent dissatisfaction with the state. Revolution is not invoked by revolutionaries but simply ‘comes’ like earthquakes. In the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, landowners stopped supporting the state when it increased taxes to cope with wars. This allowed the peasants to rise up against the state and enabled a new group to ascend to the position of power. She asked if this model was applicable to Iranian case without the crisis of war nor fiscal difficulties. In my opinion, this understanding is wrong. The Iranian state was affluent enough to avoid tax increases and the major force for the revolution was townspeople. Yet, Khomeinī succeeded in evoking the revolution by organizing demonstrations with the cultural tradition of Shiism. On the other hand, the shah, surrounded by small entourage had no ties with grassroot of the society. That was why he was so easily separated from the society. 

   The third case is Michael Foucault. He happened to stay in Iran during the revolution and had some interviews for an Italian paper in 1978. He observed the revolution through the eyes of a journalist. In the 1960s, he had shared the structuralist view with Skocpol. Yet, by this time, he observed this revolution as a post-modern revolution and paid more attention to fluid aspects than the structure, reacting against French Marxism. He perceived that the secret police had less power to suppress protests than had been imagined because it was only a congeries of often rival forces. He thought that most important weapon for the revolutionaries was ‘legitimacy.’ He observed Khomeinī fully utilized it. He attributed the cause of the revolution to the shah’s nepotism, autocracy and corruption that exclude the ordinary people, especially peasants. Because of this, he could not present himself as the symbol of revolution in contrast to the Turkish revolutionary, Kemal Ataturk, in 1920s. 

    Foucault was criticized by Western liberals that he was reluctant to criticize the autocratic and reactionary aspects of Iranian revolution. Yet, I think his approach was effective to understand not only Iranian revolution but also other revolutions in the world. 


Sakai: The Islamic revolution in Iran was the revolution that should not have occurred according to theorists of modernization in the West. Its evaluation is not fixed yet in the West, Japan and Middle East. Thus, it is better to compare the differences among scholars before comparing it with other revolutions. Here, I would like to introduce different interpretations among Japanese scholars. The first one is Kosugi Yasushi (Kyoto University). According to his interpretation, the Islamic revolution differs from the paradigm of modern revolutions, and he places it in the context of the rising tendency toward Islamic revival or Islamic reconstruction in the 1970s. It showed the limitations of de-Islamization or Westernization attempts in a Muslim society because of the holistic characteristics of Islam (undividedness between religion and politics), and because of the lack of official authority in Islam, which would have given flexibility toward Islamist movement He considered the Islamic revolution to have occurred based on the social Islamization from the bottom. He underlined its importance in claiming a non-Western and non-Eastern revolutionary Islam. The Islamic revolution in Iran was the first revolution in the Middle East not based on an imported ideology from the West. The majority of Japanese scholars of the Middle East agreed with him on this point and considered it as a Third World revolution against colonialism and the two superpowers. Most of them evaluated the Islamic revolution very positively. Later, Kosugi became the president of the Japanese Association for Middle Eastern studies. 

   The second is Shintaro Yoshimura. He distinguishes two stages; Stage One was the process that sent the Shahr into exile in early 1979 at a time of various anti-Shahr movements for regime change including that of the ulama or religious scholars. Stage Two was the period after the regime change until the official institutionalization of Wilayat Faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist) on December 3, 1979. The Islamic Republican Party led by Khomeinī’s circle won the power struggle against leftists, liberals and moderate Islamists. He admits the role of Islam even in Stage One, such as the leadership of ulama in the protest movements, the use of mosque as the center of anti-Shahr gatherings and Khomeinī’s Charisma. Nevertheless, he insists that the result of the stage two was a betrayal of the revolution. His stance might be similar to that of a scholar like Nikki Keddie 

   These two Japanese understandings of Islamic revolution in Iran may coincide with the post-modern romanticism of Foucault and the Marxist-oriented view of Keddie. I wonder whether this Japanese romanticism concerning Islam can be understood as a Japanese type of orientalism derived from traditional orientalism of thinkers such as Shumei Okawa and Tokai Sanshi in pre-war period. Or, was it from a sense of solidarity with the post-colonial Asian and African countries? (This question can be directed to Mitani) My question to Prof. Cole is whether such Japanese perception on Iranian revolution is different from that in the US and Europe. 

   My next comment is about the implication for contemporary views of Islamism among Arab protesters. The protesters in the Arab springs in 2010-11 were very skeptical about the Islamists after the fall of the dictatorship, while the Islamists simply thought that the regime change gave them the chance to introduce Islamic laws easily. The former learnt the lessons from Iranian revolution that revolution could be betrayed by political Islamists. The latter considered that the post-uprising regime should reflect social Islamization that had been led by Islamist for decades. This perception gap regarding the Islamic revolution seems to prevent mutual understanding between Islamists and secularists. My question here is whether there are any efforts paid to fill this gap between secularists’ perception and that of Islamists. In other words, can we understand that the whole process from radical revolutionary Islamic republic to more democratized moderate Islamic republic is decades of Islamic way of modernization and Iranian revolution is only the starting point for it? Or, can the revolutionary Islamic regime transform into a moderate and pragmatic regime or a democracy as other revolutionary regimes did? Dr. Cole, do you find any possibility that the post-revolution Islamic regime in Iran be democratic? If so, can we understand the Iranian revolution as a part of the whole process of the Islamic way of modernization and view it only a starting point? 

   The third question is the uniqueness of Iranian revolution. The installation of a theocracy was an earthquake for most theorists of revolution. 

   This uniqueness of Islamic revolution in Iran can be compared with Meiji Rev. which Prof. Mitani, a mastermind of this study group, argues as a revolution through re-establishment of monarchy, contrary to the commonsense of “revolution-as-toppling-monarchy” in the 20th century. Islamic revolution was indeed to topple the monarchy and establish republic in Iran, but it aimed re-establishment of theocracy. Both revolutions can be different from the typical cases in Europe as they were “reactionary” in the sense of “restoration” or “revival” of traditional system. 

   In fact, Islamism itself was translated as Islamic revivalism in Japanese 復古, same term as Meiji rev. Do you think they are comparable, and if so in what sense? (to Mitani and Cole) 


Cole: I am not well-informed on Japanese Islamic studies. Yet, the Japanese might be able to understand Iran better because they live in Asian society and always keep an eye on the superpowers. The elements we have to take into account for comparative studies are the nature of religion and monarchy. Of course, it is necessary to reconceptualize ‘revolution.’ For, example, we might be able to reevaluate Francisco Franco in Spain. Traditional interpretation based on Marxism refused to see him as a revolutionary because he belonged to right wing and supported Catholic church. Yet, he could be one of the revolutionaries. He reinforced the Spanish monarchy. Then after his death, the monarchy was united by democratic reformers with a parliamentary system. It may be possible to compare the Spanish transition during the late 1970s and the 80s fruitfully with Meiji Japan. 


Mitani: Traditionally, historians emphasized imperial restoration in the studies of Meiji revolution. Yet, I tried to detach myself from such interpretation. I think the Meiji revolution and Iranian revolution shared two characteristics: the aspiration to go back to an ideal past and the introduction of religiosity in the core of government. Yet, initial conditions were different among these revolutions. People who created the Meiji government came from samurai who were secular warriors. They utilized the emperor’s authority, symbolically absolute but without decision-making power, to create an ideal state. They tried to keep the decision-making process secular by separating it from the religious system. It was because Japan was multi-faith society. They wished to avoid any religious conflicts among various religions to secure their achievements in their revolution. Although emperor was a religious figure on top of Shinto system, he did not interfere activities of other religious groups such as Buddhists. He also did not give any moral judgements to his people beyond a brief moral rescript. 

   By the way, I would like to know what happened after the revolution. I hear Iranian theocracy soon turned into a military state. Was it true? How do you evaluate the role of Revolutionary Guard? (to Cole and Sakai) 


Cole: There were several groups that contested for state power: clerics, the old National Front, liberals and moderate Muslims. Among them, the clergy proved victorious after a large-scale suppression of guerillas in 1980s that saw a death toll of some ten thousand. It was like the Great Terror in French revolution. On the other hand, parliament was not completely without power. It does have influence, especially in spending, and represented the interests of the countryside to build rural infrastructure. This regime has survived for forty years because it is a hybrid regime of clerical institutions and a civil elected system of parliament. Military organizations, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the reconstructed army, did gain power during the war against Iraq. Yet, in any particular instance, the clerics, with Khomeinī at the head, had the ultimate power to overrule, president, parliament and military. 


Sakai: The Iranian revolution had two faces. One side led domestic social reforms. The other side aspires to export Islamic revolution beyond its borders. The role of the Revolutionary Guard gradually declined as far as domestic issues concerned. Yet, they are still active in expanding Iran’s revolutionary influence to neighboring area such as Syria and Yemen. 

Iwai: I would like to ask Iranian use of the word ‘revolution.’ Was it born inside Iran? Or, did some scholars import the word from the West? 


Cole: They had applied the contemporary Persian word 'enqelab' to the French revolution. There were many Iranian intellectuals who studied in France. This word’s root was from the Arabic of the Quran, but it had a different meaning there from this modern use. Yet, clerics applied the eighteenth-century French concept to their Islamic revolution. This enabled them to communicate both to traditional society and to intellectuals. Intellectuals were bewildered when they found that not a few who had studied in the West supported Khomeinī. 

第2回 国際研究会



Created with Sketch.


概要: 第2回国際会議は東アジアと北米メンバーの会議で、比較のためのプラットフォーム、ロシア革命、イラン革命について、発表と討論を行った。最初にメンバーそれぞれが簡単に近況を紹介した後、第1セッションに入った。 

■ 参加者(以下、敬称略)




海外研究協力者:David Bell、朴薫、Melissa Stockdale、Juan Cole






指定討論者:David Bell


発表: Hiroshi Mitani, ‘A Basic Argument for the Comparison of Revolutions’(「革命比較のための基礎」) 


  三谷の長時間の発言が困難なので、英文原稿を鰐淵秀一が代読した。このペーパーは、地域的・時間的に多様な革命、八つを比較するために共通のプラットフォームを用意しようとするものであった。三谷はまず、第1回研究会に際して始まった革命期間をどう見るかという議論をもとに、革命にはその時点での短期的な視点と後世から振り返って意味づける長期的な視点とがあり、いずれも重要とした。次いで、長期的視点から見ると、革命の成果がどのように確保されたかが重要であるとして「歯止め」の概念を提出し、各革命で「歯止め」となった要因を列挙した(この部分は時間的制約のため朗読せず)。さらには、この研究会の主題である「公論」や「暴力」の政体変革との関係を視覚的に表示しようと試みた。政体変革に関しては、無変化、政権保持者のみの変化、君主制下の権力構造の変化、君主制下の権力構造と身分の変化、君主制廃止による権力構造と身分の変化、五つのレヴェルを設定した。公論に関しては、印刷物の発行点数を数える困難を考えて、その代替指標として検閲の有無・厳しさに注目し、これを四つの順位尺度として使った。暴力については、各種の内乱や戦争を網羅した事典がある(Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015 )ので、ここから各革命での犠牲者の数を集計して比例尺度として使った。そうした準備の上で、この三つの次元の相互関係を見るために三つのグラフを作り、各革命を人口の相違が見えるようにしながらプロットした。三谷は最後に、明治維新について、変革パタンの簡単な分析を示した。明治維新での政治動乱は1858年から1877年まで約20年であったが、主な変革は後半の10年間に行われた。1868年の王政復古を皮切りとして政体のみならず身分制の変革までが一気に行われたのである。前半10年間に生じた政体変化は僅かであり、印刷物の流布はなく、暴力行使も相対的には少なかった。しかし、この期間における政府批判や政治交渉抜きには後半の変化は起きなかった。暴力に関しては、明田鉄男『幕末維新全殉難者名鑑』4冊(廃藩までをリストアップ)から政治的死者を数え、不足分のデータも合わせて、当面、約31610人と推計した。他の革命と同じく、公論と暴力は政治動乱の発端で同時に出現したが、両者は戊辰内乱の際に飛躍的に重要性を高めた。激しい内乱の最中、新聞はその一武器として登場したのである。ただし、その後両者は別の動きをした。暴力が鎮まる一方、新聞と演説による公論は定着した。かつ、西南内乱を機に暴力行使はなくなった。公論と暴力の分離が早期に行われ、定着したのが日本の特徴であったように思われる。 

Bell:(指定討論者)革命の比較は古くかつ扱いの厄介な問題である。まず革命とは何か、あてはまるのはどの事件か、その発生と経路を左右する要因は何か、そこに繰り返すパタンはあるのか。こうした問題を最初に取り上げたのは Craine Brinton (1938) で、彼はイギリス・アメリカ・フランス・ロシア、四つの革命を取り上げ、共通するライフ・サイクルを指摘した。数十年後、マルクス主義の影響下に、多くの社会科学者たち(Barrington Moor, Theda Skocpol, Jack Goldstone)が革命を引き起こす構造的条件を探った。今日、比較を試みる歴史家は多くないが例外もある。イギリス史家 Steve Pincus は革命を政治的経済的近代化に対する競合するプロジェクトの結果として把握し、最近には政治文化史家が、諸革命を18世紀に英・仏で作られたテーマの変奏として描き出そうとした。その代表例は、Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein, eds., Scripting Revolution である。 

  三谷が提出したモデルはこのいずれとも異なって、革命間の共通性より差異に注目している。また、革命の原因ではなくて、革命の過程、いかに急進化し、人命の犠牲を生じたかに注目している。三谷は、Brinton の4革命に4つの革命を加え、三つの変数、政体変革・言論の自由・暴力の強度の空間の中に配置しようとしている。これらの変数の相互作用に共通したパタンを見いだせるだろうか。 






三谷:シリア・イエメンとチュニジア・イエメンとを分けるべきだというのはその通りで、すぐ修正する。また、干渉戦争の犠牲者はできるだけ勘定すべきだと考える。この点でBell 先生とは意見が違う。この研究会を始めて一番印象的だった発見は、明治維新がいかに孤立した革命だったか、外国からの干渉なしに国内だけで改革をやったかということだった。死者が少なかった原因の一つがそれだと気づいた。ヨーロッパや中東の革命は逆に外国からの干渉や戦争が常態だった。なので、一般的に、革命研究には外国との関係、そこから生じた犠牲も考慮せねばならない。 







指定討論者:Melissa K. Stockdale


発表:Yoshiro Ikeda,‘ The notion of citizens in the Russian revolutionary discourse from February 1917 to October 1918 ’ 




  本報告を通じて主張したいのは、第一に公共空間(public sphere)の出現が政治的衝突の緩和をもたらすとは限らず、衝突の激化をもたらすこともあること。第二に、市民のような政治概念と社会的現実の間には常にズレがあり、そのズレが政治的妥協の余地をもたらすこと。第三に、いくつかの革命(特に20世紀)では啓蒙というイデオロギーが巨大な暴力を生んだことである。 

Stockdale:(指定討論者)池田がコロニツキ(Boris Kolonitskii)とファイジズ(Orlando Figes)の研究を踏まえて、ロシア革命中に「市民」概念が諸勢力によって異なる意味で用いられたことを、史料の博捜によって説得的に示したと評価した。その上で、以下の3つの論点を提示した。 









三谷:明治維新には初めシナリオがなかった。 先行革命のシナリオあるいはスクリプトにこだわると比較はできなくなる。ソ連の1928年以後の農業集団化に伴う死者はロシア革命の犠牲者に含められるだろうか。  




発表者:Juan Cole



発表:Juan Cole,‘ Keddie, Skocpol, Foucault: The Academy and the Comtean Shock of the Islamic Revolution, 1978-1979  ’ 
(「 ケディー、スコッチポール、フーコー:アカデミーと1978年-1979年のイスラム革命についての社会科学者のショック 」) 





  さて、この革命はどう理解されたか、紹介を始めよう。まず、ニッキー・ケディ(Nikki Keddie:コウルの師)。シャーの統治下、大資本がイランを支配し、大銀行や製鋼所などに無計画な資本投下がなされた。製鋼所は競争力がなかったが、その所有は先進国となるために必須とシャーは考えたのである、その一方、彼らは伝統的なバザール商人を嫌悪し、手工業者や中小農民を軽視した。しかし、ケディはイラン革命の原因は近代化の急ぎ過ぎとは見ず、一部の上層ホワイトカラーにのみ利益が渡るという、国民所得の分配における不平等にあると見た。急進勢力は都市への農民の大量流入によって引き起こされた社会的緊張を非難し、ゲリラ的攻撃を続け、それが革命の引き金を引いた。私自身はテロの影響をケディよ小さく見積もっている。 

  テーダ・スコッチポル (Theda Skocpol)。彼女は国家・地主・貧農の関係の構造的分析から始めた。農民は常に国家は不満をもっているが、国家が農民を抑えられなくなると、革命が生ずる。革命は革命家が引き起こすのではなく、地震のように、単に「やってくる」。フランス、ロシア、中国の革命では、戦争による財政危機が増税を招き、地主が国家から離れていった。すると農民は反乱を起こし、新たなグループが権力を掌握する道を開いた。スコチポルは、このモデルが戦争も国家の財政難もないイランの革命にあてはまるかどうか問うた。私の意見では、イランは財政的には豊かで増税の必要がなく、革命の主体は農民ではなく都市民だった。にもかかわらず、しかしホメイニはシーア派の文化伝統を動員してデモを組織して革命に成功したのである。逆に、シャーは小さな取り巻き連に囲まれるだけで、社会の草の根とは繋がりがなく、社会から簡単に切り離されたのである。 






  まず小杉泰(京都大)は、イランのイスラーム革命を近代革命のパラダイムに対する革命として理解し、それを70年代のイスラーム復興/再建の傾向の高まりの中に位置づける。彼によれば、それは、イスラーム社会における脱イスラーム化/西欧化の試みの限界、イスラームの全人格性(宗教と政治の不可分性)、およびイスラームにおける公的権限の欠如がイスラーム主義運動に対して柔軟性を与えたため、発生したとされている。彼は、イスラーム革命は底辺からの社会的なイスラーム化に基づいて起こったと考える。 また、「西でも東でもない革命的イスラーム」を主張する上でも、その重要性を強調している。この点については、中東地域研究者の多くが小杉と同意見であり、この革命を二つの超大国の支配と植民地主義に対する第三世界の革命として捉え、その多くは肯定的に受け止めている。 
















* 録画、および同時通訳の録音を行った。 

第5回 ワークショップ 



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■ 参加者
研究代表者:三谷 博


研究協力者:岩井淳、山崎耕一、早川理穂 、朴薫

ゲスト: 福岡万里子、中野弘喜(東京大学出版会・編集) 


発表者: 鰐淵秀一「アメリカ革命における公論と暴力―転換点としての1775年」 


司会: 三谷博

  本報告は、まずAmerican Revolutionという名称の由来について、18世紀には名誉革命を指していたrevolutionという語が1776年の独立宣言の後まもなく北米植民地の独立に用いられるようになったことを指摘した上で、研究史上、革命における暴力への見方がどのように変化したのかを紹介した後、公論と暴力の関係が1775年の独立戦争勃発を機に後者優位に変化したことを指摘し、暴力拡大局面における公論の役割を論じた。 





鰐淵:確かにロックに結びついたと言えるだろう。国王を暴君と見なし、civil government の違反者と名指して暴力行使をやむなしとした。ペインは千年王国思想を啓蒙に結びつけたが、聖職者が啓蒙思想を取り込んだ面もある。相互浸透があった。 












鰐淵:アメリカ政府は、ハイチ革命、つまりサン・ドマングの奴隷革命に注目していたが、結局 、奴隷反乱の波及を恐れて革命で成立した黒人国家を承認しなかった。南北戦争まで見ないと比較できないのはそうだが、フランスではナポレオンが奴隷制を復活したのではないか。 


鰐淵:独立戦争後の第3期にも革命の大義に基づく民衆暴力は多発した。建国の父たちは、デモクラシー(民衆支配)への不信感を持っていたため、これを抑えるように合衆国憲法をデザインした。フロンティアでは対先住民への暴力がはびこり、これを推進するため合衆国陸軍を造ったが、その規模は大きくなかった。各邦(州)内の軍事力の主力は民兵で、治安維持のためこれを州兵として管理したが、それが行き届かない地域(フロンティア)のために合衆国陸軍が作られた。 植民者の中では元来身分差がなく、革命の中で政治参加は活発化した。独立前から選挙権にイギリスと同様の財産制限が置かれていたが、土地所有者はほぼすべて選挙権を有し、多くが対等の立場にあった。取り残されたのは都市の民衆、職人たちで、彼らが都市暴動の主体となったが、彼らは少数だった。独立後、憲法を造る際には財産制限が弱められている。これに対し、先住民には市民権が与えられず、“domestic dependent nations”(国家内従属民)という名の下に別の法体系が作られた。 


岩井:研究史を振り返りたい。日本でアメリカ革命はどう位置づけられてきたか。桑原武夫編『ブルジョワ革命の比較研究』では英独仏の革命や中国、日本を取り上げるが、アメリカ革命は扱われていない。他方、法学部系では、高木八尺ほか編『人権宣言集』のなかの斎藤真の翻訳箇所にあるように、合衆国憲法は高く評価されてきた。ブルジョワ革命と市民革命という捉え方で扱いが異なるようだ。 欧米の文脈に立ち戻ると、アメリカ革命はフランス革命の勃発によって位置づけが変わったように見える。鰐淵報告では、アメリカ革命と名誉革命の連続性が指摘されたが、トマス・ペインは『人間の権利』において18世紀後半のアメリカとフランスの革命を、共に共和主義を実現した革命として高く評価した。他方、複合国家での暴力行使も興味深い。ピューリタン革命の場合、アイルランドでの虐殺は大規模であり、同様に一般に死傷者の少ないことが強調される名誉革命時にもアイルランドで戦闘が生じた。民族や宗教によって扱いが差別されるのが重要な問題なのではないか。最後に、バリントン・ムーアが独立戦争よりも南北戦争を重要な革命として位置づけるのをどのように評価するか。





鰐淵:中東介入の直接的な背景としては、第2次世界大戦後の対ドイツ・日本占領・改革介入が成功と見なされてきたことがあるのではないか。無論、根本には独立戦争と立憲体制形成の成功記憶がある。American Revolution とは、現在の連邦政府や共和党の見解では、啓蒙思想に基づいた最古の共和政体、民主主義を体現する憲法を創り出した革命とされる。この国家アイデンティティが、政策決定者たちの中に、同様のことが世界各地でできるはずとの思い込みを潜在させているのではないか。 










the 4th preliminary workshop

June 26, 2021  

on zoom

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Here is the summary of the fourth preliminary workshop. Professor Keiko Sakai presented her paper on Middle Eastern revolutions and other members joined discussions to elaborate its meaning from comparative perspective. 


■The participants were: 

Hiroshi Mitani, Harumi Goto, Shuichi Wanibuchi, Hiroyuki Shiode, Yoshiro Ikeda, Hideo Fukamachi, Keiko Sakai, Jun Iwai, Koichi Yamazaki, Hun Park, Riho Hayakawa, (Arranger: Mie Shikano )

■Paper: Keiko Sakai, “Locating the protest demonstrations after the ‘Arab Uprisings’ on the history of revolutions in Arab world.”

Moderator: Hiroshi Mitani 

Presenter: Keiko Sakai 

Discussant: Hiroyuki Shiode 

Recorder: Harumi Goto 

   Purpose of this presentation was to cast a light on the conventional concept of Revolution, by overviewing the revolutionary activities in the Middle East, mainly focusing on the cases in the Arab society which led to the succeeding “Arab uprisings” since 2010-11. Sakai shed light on the transformation of the usage of the term for uprising, from “thawra” in the Arab uprising a decade ago to “hirak” in the recent protest movements in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. This change can be understood as a shift of the preference from conventional leftist concept of revolution, which became bases for Arab nationalist authoritarian regimes in the 50s-60s, to civilian concept of street protest movements. They are also considered as unorganized political movements, similar to “intifada”. 
   In the beginning of her presentation, she surveyed the history of popular uprisings which are considered as “revolutions” in the Arab world. She tried to categorize the cases of revolution into the following four patterns:
 (1) Primordial local popular riots (often led by traditional local elites) against the centralization/ modernization/ colonization in the 19th century and anti-colonial resistance based on proto-nationalism (-1920s),
 (2) A series of Arab Nationalist/ leftist army officers’coups starting from Egypt (1952), together with the flourishment of labor movements and student movements (1930s-60s),
 (3) Internal power struggles among the Arab nationalists/ military officers, and emergence of revolutionary Islamist movements, which led to the establishment of Islamic republic in Iran (1979),
 (4) The end of the “Great Revolutions”, and the emergence of popular protest movements such as Intifadas in Palestine and Iraq, as well as Arab Uprising in 2010-11/ 2019-. 

   Sakai analyzed the selected major “revolutions” from the above cases, picking up several factors such as the role of military (compulsory or voluntary/ its relation with the society/ possibility of foreign intervention/ economic interests of the army, relation between the army and the security forces etc.), and the patterns of popular mobilization by protest movements, as well as their relation with the regime and/ or military. 
   Although in embryo, Sakai concluded temporarily as follows: there is a clear difference between the “thawra = revolutions” after Arab uprisings from 2010-11 and the “thawra = military coups” led by leftist Arab Nationalist military officers in 1950s-60s. The former intentionally made their movement unorganized, thus succeeded in mobilizing various social classes. Their attempts, however, were mostly foiled and derailed, and regimes tightened their control over the civil society. It would be appropriate to compare the protest movements in the Arab states with those in former socialist states, as well as in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Sakai raised a question whether it is possible to consider the protest movements which only pursue the regime change, without pursuing establishing an alternative regime. 


   Shiode asked the following questions: (1) On the definition of revolution. Are social movements necessary factor for revolution? In the case of Meiji revolution of Japan, there were no social movements. (2) Is there any model for “thawra”? (3) The role of media and public discussion. Were there any changes after the Arab uprisings?
   Sakai replied as follows: (1) As for conventional “revolutions” led by Arab nationalist military officers, few social movements were witnessed preceding to the coups. In that sense, they were “regime changes without social movements”. However, in some cases large scale mass mobilization were witnessed which supported the coups=regime change. On the contrary, the protest movements in the Arab uprising can be understood “movements to change the regime without holding power”. (2) In the traditional usage of the term of “thawra” in Islamic history, it was considered as negative attempt to divide Islamic unity. I guess the term started to be used in a positive sense once the concept of modern revolutions such as French revolution and Russian revolution were introduced in the Middle East. (3) The impact of new information technology such as internet, satellite TV and mobile phone was extremely profound to the development of the protest movements. However, it cannot be said that SNS was the main factor that caused Arab uprisings. 
    Next, Hideo Fukamachi raised a question why the cases in Turkey were not mentioned in Sakai’s analysis. He argued that it was common for the study on China to compare Chinese revolution with Turkish revolution in the beginning of the 20th century. Ikeda added, saying that Sakai’s analysis lacked Iranian constitutional revolution. Sakai agreed with their understanding the importance of constitutional revolutions in Ottoman empire and Qajar Persia, but she said she excluded them from her analysis because they ought to be understood in the context of modernization, or “Westernization”, and the mainstream of the revolutions after the independence were rather colored by anti-colonialism/ anti-Westernization ideas. In this sense constitutional revolutions in the beginning of the 20th century should be analyzed in a different point of view. Fukamachi also asked about the role of the military, considering the possibility of comparison with the cases in contemporary Turkey, Japan and China. Sakai agreed on his point, responding that the military officers in the Arab states were educated as elites of the state and considered as avantgarde in the society, and this phenomenon could be seen widely in Asia and other developing countries. Related to this question, Mitani and Park suggested the possibility of comparison among military coups in Turkey, Egypt, South Korea and Japan. 
    Fukamachi casted doubt in defining “revolution” as something that led to democratization; he presented a wider definition the ‘regime change by violence.’ 
    Next, Wanibuchi pointed out the resemblance of ‘hirak’ to today’s Black Lives Matter(BLM) in sharing the nature of movement without core organizations and presented the question if ‘hirak’ has any alignments with other movements outside the Middle East like the American civil rights movement and African independence movements. Sakai agreed, saying that the contemporary Palestinian and other Arab resistance movements feel the close ties with BLM, adopting the symbol of Mr. Floyd’s death to the harsh treatment of Israeli security forces of Palestinians. 
    Sakai added that there were such notions or slogans shared by the protest movements in the Arab uprisings, but it was not the notion of revolution. Rather they shared the terms such as “dignity”, “regime change”, or “anger”. Ikeda asked whether political thinkers in the Arab state attempted to locate their “revolutions” in the genealogy of revolutions in the West. Sakai repeated that the leftist nationalist revolutionary thinkers considered their revolutions as a part of secular nationalist movements and/or socialist movements which can be also seen the West. Even among the Islamist thinkers such as Ali Shariati of Iran, there were attempts to overcome the Western notion of capitalism, socialism or democracy. This means that modern Islamist thinkers were not alien from the notion of “revolutions” in the West but they attempted to find the alternative to them.
    Mitani asked why Muslim Brotherhood failed in keeping power after legitimate election. Sakai explained that intellectuals and middle class became scared of MB’s control over the state when it attempted to establish Islamize Egyptian constitution and other state institutions. People staged a demonstration against the Brotherhood much bigger than the one during the Arab uprisings.

    Later Fukamachi and Sakai exchanged their ideas. Fukamachi pointed out Hongkong demonstrators show the flags of Britain and the US to identify them as a successor of Western democratic ideas. Turkish demonstrators in Taksim Gezi Park in 2013 and the attempted military coup in 2016 seemed to be based on similar thoughts. Sakai agreed on the similarity between the case in Hong Kong and that in Turkey, but denied the possibility of carrying the flags of US or UK in the protests in the Middle East. Protesters in Arab Uprisings were careful enough not to be looked like pro-American in order to avoid being seen as pro-American, pro-Israeli or “agent of the foreign power”. In Turkish case, anti-Erdoğan people who demonstrated at Gezi Park based on Kemalian secularism also opposed to the military coup. There are deep cleavages between the urban intellectuals and the peasants and urban poor who support religious conservatism and AKP government. We can find such kind of class structure in many Middle Eastern countries. Antagonism between Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts in Thailand might be similar to this. 

第4回 ワークショップ 



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■ 参加者
研究代表者:三谷 博




「 中東全域の革命の歴史のなかでの『アラブの春』以降の路上抗議運動の位置づけ 」 






  とくに注目するのは、これらの運動の自称「サウラ thawra」(反乱、革命)と「ヒラーク hirak」(運動の変化型)。アラブの春においては、「サウラ」が共通して用いられたが、アルジェリアやサウジやヨルダンなど王政諸国では2018年以降、「ヒラーク」が頻用されるようになった。これらの路上抗議運動は、1950年代に行われた「サウラ」が長期独裁政権になった事実からこれを忌避し、「ヒラーク」を用い始めたようである。政府への抗議「インティファーダ 」だけでなく、組織らしい組織を持たない運動形態も意味するようになっている。 




cf. 政治革命(体制変更)のない「アラブの春」/社会運動なしに成功した明治維新 

cf.「インティファーダ」――パレスチナの対イスラエル抵抗運動から生まれた呼称だが、 「体制転換」ではなく「抵抗・従わないこと」が鍵。
cf. 「民はニザーム(体制)の転覆を望む」というスローガンがあるが、この「ニザーム」が「現体制」なのか、「国家体制」なのかも争点。





cf. 英・米・仏におけるrevolutionでは、外来語としての「革命」のなかで、立憲政治や社会的発展・進歩の必須条件を含意する、一定の革命概念が作られた。



Black Lives Matterは公民権運動と違い団体が指導したものではなく、SNSを介して個人を動員し、公権力に対する抗議運動となった点で「ヒラーク」と共通しているかもしれない。



①について:英語でもPersian Constitutional Revolutionで、ペルシャ語の呼称でもconstitutionalという意味は含まれている。






反エルドアン抗議の底流にはケマル主義=世俗主義があるが、軍クーデタにも同じ層が反対している。公正発展党の躍進は宗教的保守の農村・都市貧困層を背景にしていたのに対し、ゲジ公園のデモは西欧的知識層による。農村・都市下層貧困層と中間層(知識人層)とのギャップの大きさと後者に前者に対する軽視は、中東の各地で問題である(cf. タイの赤シャツ・黄シャツ対立)。


The 1st International Meeting

DAY 2: December 19, 2020

9:00-11:30(JST), Dec. 18, 19:00-21:30 (EST) 

on Zoom 

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Theme: The French Revolution and the Chinese Revolution 

■The participants were (in order of the period of revolutions): 

Harumi Goto, Jun Iwai, Shuichi Wanibuchi, David Bell, Masato Taira, Riho Hayakawa, Koichi Yamazaki, Hiroshi Mitani, Hiroyuki Shiode, Hun Park,
Yoshiro Ikeda, Melissa Stockdale, Hideo Fukamachi, Jeffery Wasserstrom,
Keiko Sakai, Joan Cole, Mie Shikano

Brief self-introduction by the participants

Part 1: The French Revolution 

Chair: Yoshiro Ikeda 

Presentation:David Bell, ‘The ‘Queen of the World’ and the ‘Volcano of the People’: The Public Sphere and Violence in the French Revolution’ 

Major issues discussed: 


  Hayakawa began a discussion with three questions; who judged the difference between ‘good violence’ and ‘bad violence’ in the revolutionary moment? Did people’s violence decrease as revolutionary leaders successfully controlled them? How can we discern ‘public opinion’ when literacy was sharply divided between elites and common people? Next, Wanibuchi asked how the concept of ‘revolution’ changed in relation to the images of the preceding revolutions in Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands. Taira asked about the starting and ending points of the French revolution and raised a question if popular violence might continue after the 1775 rebellion in another form. Stockdale asked how the political education for the mass was enabled during the French revolution from the technological and financial points of view.

  To these questions, Bell answered that it is possible to see the year of 1880 as the ending of the revolution as Francois Furet argued; public opinion at that time was so varied that we can understand its meaning only with its context; people shifted their trust from in public opinion toward in violence when public opinion failed in representing the people’s will; revolutionaries realized the needs for the education of peasants but faced the obstacle from the Catholic church.

  Next, Iwai asked what kinds of books French intellectuals read to learn the British revolution before and during the French revolution. Ikeda took notice of the concept of ‘nature’ that Bell argues in the paper that there were two meanings in contemporary usage: as people’s uncontrollable power and as a reliable partner. To the question of Mitani whether foreign wars were provoked in order to suppress civil wars, Bell pointed out the fact that the introduction of popular conscription accelerated domestic rebellions and they ceased only after the Bonaparte regime was established.  

  Next, the participants discussed about the concept of ‘revolution’ again. Sakai argued that it is necessary to make a distinction between the term ‘the Revolution’ and ‘the revolutionary (events)’ as many revolutions in 21st-century Middle East failed. Wasserstrom pointed out that the Chinese revolution consisted of various small-letter ‘revolutions’ in ‘The Revolution,’ but it is difficult to distinguish the two concepts in Chinese. Cole argued that there are three possible usages in Arabic: system changes in polity, people’s overthrow of the government, and coup d’état. In Egypt, there was an overthrow of government happened in 2011 and a coup d’état by the military in 2013. People in Egypt are confused in applying the same word ‘revolution’ to the both incidents. 

Part 2: The Chinese Revolution 

Chair: Yoshiro Ikeda 

Presentation: Hideo Fukamachi, ‘Sanctifying Violence: The Making of the National Revolutionary Army in 1920s China’ 

Major issues discussed: 

  First, Wasserstrom served as the commentator for Fukamachi’s paper. He pointed out that there were two criterions to distinguish the revolutionary army from warlords: whether it was positive about mobilizing people; what aspects of Sun Yat-sen’s ideology the two parties stressed. Both the Nationalist and the Communist Parties denounced the warlords’ armies for their indifference to popular mobilization. They also differentiated with each other by drawing on different principles from Sun’s ideology: The negation of class struggle by the Nationalist Party and anti-imperialism by the Communist Party. 

  Fukamachi explained that the focus of his paper is to shed light on the attitude of revolutionaries toward violence and show that Chinese revolutionaries were eager to evoke violence from the outset in contrast to French ones in the early stage of the French Revolution that Bell has pointed out. 

  Park argued the relationship between public opinion and violence varies according to the form of violence. In the case of Japan, the reconstruction of political order might have been easier than the cases of other revolutions because violence was employed only by state armies. Fukamachi replied that both the Nationalist and the Communist Parties relied on their own armies despite of their ideology of representing ‘the people’s will.’ To Goto’s question, he answered that revolutionary armies were not welcomed by local people in contrast to Qing garrisons before the Xinhai revolution. 

  To Ikeda’s question, Fukamachi answered that the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 was a typical case of mass violence that intellectual leaders tried to avoid afterward. This was the reason why the Nationalist Party was less eager to mobilize people than the Communist. Ikeda generalized this observation and argued that this was one of the usages of negative memory that was comparable to the British reference to the Thirty Years’ War that Braddick has pointed out. Wasserstrom added that the Communist Party altered the memory into a positive one because of Boxer’s anti-imperialist passion. 

  Next, Cole argued that the military sometimes plays a decisive role as in the Middle Eastern revolutions in 2011 and we may classify the Chinese Revolution in the same category. Then, Mitani posed the question about how the government treated the victorious military after the war because it sometimes brings a grave threat to a new government as the early years of Meiji Japan showed. Stockdale asked what kind of people who became soldiers were and what factors kept them staying in the army. 

The 1st International Meeting

DAY 1: December 15, 2020

18:00-20:30(JST), 9:00-11:30(GMT)

on Zoom 

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Theme: The British Revolution 

■The participants were (in order of the period of revolutions): 

Michael J. Braddick, Harumi Goto, Jun Iwai, Shuichi Wanibuchi, Masato Taira,
Riho Hayakawa, Koichi Yamazaki, Hiroshi Mitani, Hun Park, Harald Fuess,
Yoshiro Ikeda, Keiko Sakai, Mie Shikano 

Opening Session 

Chair: Yoshiro Ikeda 

Brief self-introduction by the participants 

Opening remarks by Hiroshi Mitani 
(* see another content 'Opening Remarks' in this page)

Chair: Yoshiro Ikeda 

Michael J. Braddick,‘Violence and the public sphere in the English revolution’ 

Professor Braddick argued his understanding of the‘long English revolution,’an idea first suggested to him by Professor Pincus, which covers the period from the 1640s to 1720s, and then responded to Mitani’s questions: they were 1) How long did violence continue? 2) How did the public sphere separated itself from violence? 3) What factors decided the nature of government after the revolution? 4) How did following generations and other peoples interpret the revolution? 


■Major issues discussed were as follows: 


  Fuess opened the ball with the comparison between print in seventeenth-century England and social media today. Then the discussions went on mainly around the English revolution per se. 

  First, Iwai asked about Professor Braddick’s term ‘the long English revolution’ in relation to the three books: Braddick’s own God's Fury, England's Fire, Steve Pincus’s 1688: The First Modern Revolution and J.G.A. Pocock’s Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776. Braddick replied that he sees Pincus overstates the importance of the Glorious Revolution and Pocock’s third British revolution (the American revolution) was different in nature from the preceding two in terms of its political and social implications. In response to Goto’s question on the role of 1660 in the long British Revolution, he summarized the three achievements made by 1641/49, 1660, 1688/89 political changes. 

  Mitani moved focus to religious policy and asked how religious toleration was achieved in a monotheist society. Braddick answered that people in the seventeenth century called it ‘comprehension’ and it began without questioning the interpretation of ‘God’s will’ among the Anglican church and other Protestant groups as well as by excluding Catholics from the comprehension. To Fuess’s question of why English people continues to hate Catholics calling them ‘Popery,’ he indicated that the word ‘Popery’ represented to being ‘the otherness’ of ‘Englishness.’ 

  To the question about the role of aristocrats, Professor Braddick pointed out that they belonged to both sides of the conflict, royalists and parliamentarians, adding the fact that there was little change in the possession of property. Then, Sakai asked the role of the non-traditional elite. Braddick replied that the radicals like Levelers and Diggers came from the non-traditional elite. Ikeda raised the question about the function of the memory of legendary leaders in the British revolution when compared to Pugachev in Russia or Babeuf in France. Braddick’s answer was that the memory of Lilburne was suppressed after the Glorious Revolution but revived in the 1790s, and it was inherited by leftist historians. 

  Next, the topic moved to the relationship between public opinion and violence. Mitani asked why the death toll during the British Revolution sharply declined after the Restoration of 1660. Professor Braddick answered that Charles II achieved a reconciliation with Parliament so that he could gained support from the royalist mass. Mitani also questioned why the 1688/89 incident was called ‘revolution’ instead of another ‘restoration.’ Professor Braddick’s answer was that we may call it a ‘restoration.’ To the question when public opinion severed itself from violence, he pointed out that, even after the Revolution ended, people continued to see public opinion as a threat to social stability. 

  Then, Taira questioned if it is valid to merely count the number of publication and death tolls in order to measure the impact of print and violence. Braddick responded that it is useful to count the numbers if it is done properly. For example, the death toll in the British revolution consisted mainly of deaths in battles but few in street violence, and this was quite different from the case of the French revolution. 

  Finally, Ikeda asked about people’s perception toward the title of William of Orange, who was both the stadtholder of the Dutch republic and the monarch of England after 1688. Ikeda suggested that we should not see the clear divide between republic and monarchy before the French revolution. Braddick largely agreed and added that the English people discussed it primarily when Oliver Cromwell became the protector. 


The 1st International Meeting

Opening Remarks

DAY 1: December 15, 2020 18:00-20:30(JST), 9:00-11:30(GMT)
on Zoom 

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■Opening remarks by Hiroshi Mitani 

     It is my great pleasure and honor to open the first international workshop for the comparative studies of revolutions with a particular focus on the relationship between violence and the public sphere. Today, all the members are able to join globally via Zoom despite the enormous difficulties caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

     This project has epoch-making implications in various ways. First of all, we try to revitalize revolution studies that had almost lost historians’ interest for decades. After socialist regimes were abandoned in Europe, the ardent expectations and enthusiasm for revolution vanished, even though they had gained much support and power in every corner of the world during the first half of the 20th century. Yet, many people today aspire to live better lives without suffering from oppressive regimes. Also, people learned to avoid violence and terror after the massive use of violence by the two world wars and postwar oppressive regimes. It must be an important task for us today to reflect on various revolutions in the past through dispassionate eyes.

     What is revolution? It must be one of the major issues for us to discuss in this project. For the time being, I would like to define it as the large-scale rearrangement of human rights. It is often accompanied by the intentional use of violence or civil wars. Yet, the rearrangement of human rights does not always accompany the massive use of violence. For example, the Meiji Revolution that abolished the samurai aristocracy demanded only about thirty thousand death tolls. On the other hand, for example, the Thirty Years’ War did not see the major redistribution of human rights despite a high number of sacrifices. By this definition, we can recognize the Meiji revolution as one of the revolutions while excluding the Thirty Years’ War from revolutions.

     Yet, I would like to propose to focus on the measures of revolution rather than the changes: how much a revolution change the conditions of human rights? What does invite violence to a revolution? In what conditions is violence restrained? How are revolutionary achievements secured after the use of violence? Also, we would like to examine the relations between public opinion and violence. While public opinion and violence emerge hand in hand with each other at the outset of revolution, they must dissociate one from another to establish a new order and we see whether the pen begins to restrain the sword to introduce a liberal order or organized violence eliminates public opinion. 

Our aim is to investigate these questions by comparing six major revolutions in modern history. It is my great honor to welcome the eminent historians of revolutions from Europe, North America, South Korea and Japan. I expect you will enjoy fruitful discussions.

     We tentatively pick up six revolutions, enumerating in order of age, the British, French, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern revolutions. This selection indicates the second purpose of this project. In the past, the comparative studies of revolutions mainly focused on the regions around the Atlantic. This project extends the geographical coverage into East Asia and Middle East to do a comparison on a global scale. Today, we are all suffering from the Covid-19 pandemic. This shows the fact that human beings cannot survive anymore without global imagination. It must be indispensable for people living in every corner of the world to begin efforts to study other regions to discover commonalities among great diversities. I hope this project will contribute to nurturing such global imagination. 

     The third goal of our project is to focus on the relations between public opinion and violence. To understand revolution, it is necessary to understand the outline of the collapse and reconstruction of political order with its social? environment. Yet, it is difficult to understand every aspect of revolution, especially in comparative studies. Thus, we would like to focus on the relations between public opinion and violence.

     Through our preliminary research, we found that there emerge public opinion and violence simultaneously in almost every revolution. First, people start raising an open complaint toward some political decisions. This protest sometimes invites violent suppression by the government and people respond to it by a violent movement. If the mediating effort fails in the early stage, speech and violence synergistically escalate and make the regime collapse to the point that the recovery of the regime is impossible. Our fist task is to investigate in the ways of this self-destructive process and to find conditions to restrain it. Another task is to understand the conditions of divergence between liberal and autocratic regimes. At the end of revolution, popular violence is eliminated mainly by organized violence of a new government. The new regime often gets autocratic. Nevertheless, some revolutions yield non-autocratic governments. Why is a liberal polity possible where public speech changes its function from the ally of violence to the opposite? In other words, how does the ‘public sphere’ that Jürgen Habermas adores become possible? As you all know, this must be one of the most significant issues that the world in the twenty-first century faces.

Then, hereafter, I would like to add another statement on the aim of this project based on my own research on the Meiji Revolution. 

     My research theme is the political and social history of nineteenth-century Japan, especially of the Meiji Revolution. To introduce to you my work, I sent you an article, titled ‘The Meiji Revolution’ published in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. You may be able to gain a more detailed understanding if my plan to publish the English version of my book ‘Rethinking the Meiji Restoration’ be realized. For this series of workshop, I will present a paper on public opinion and violence during the Meiji Revolution.

     Let me explain my motive to organize this global-scale study of revolutions in a comparative perspective. From the beginning of my study on the Meiji Revolution, I have had doubt about the traditional understanding that categorize this transformation called Meiji Ishin as a mere restoration of the crown and, thus, not classify it as one of revolutions. Yet, this transformation dismantled the early modern ruling elite samurai and made all inhabitants on the Japanese archipelago into a ‘nation’ who shared equal rights and responsibility. No one can doubt that it was one of the large-scale rearrangements of human rights. Also, it saw comparatively small death tolls: about thirty thousand, in contrast to about one million and fifty-five thousand during the French revolution. It is very difficult for any societies to dismantle the ruling elite and revolutions mostly see numerable death tolls. Yet, the Meiji Revolution abolished a major part of aristocracy without much sacrifice. This fact evokes an interesting question about, if a bloodless revolution is possible, in what conditions less bloody revolution does occur.

     Yet, these facts have been mostly ignored both in Japan and outside. One of the reasons was because of the Japanese intellectual tradition. From the end of the nineteenth century, Japanese intellectuals glorified the transformation by the term ‘restoration’ because they saw the heart of the regime change as the return of the emperor to the one and only sovereignty. 

     Another reason was the global intellectual custom in the twentieth century. After the Russian revolution, it became a world-wide common sense to view a revolution as the overthrow of a monarchy that is achieved by the intensive use of violence and propaganda. The French revolution became understood through this framework. In this intellectual milieu, it was impossible to imagine for a monarchy to spread equality among a nation and, thus, the Meiji revolution tended to be seen as a pseud revolution. To be sure, the upper aristocracy kept its privileges and women’s rights continued to be restricted. Yet, the National Diet established in 1890 had the right to make laws and discuss a budget, and universal suffrage for men was introduced in 1925. Imperial Japan achieved democracy and liberalism to some degree.

     In the 1930s, the Japanese military started the territorial expansion toward the continent and suppressed the freedom of speech. This was not the direct outcome of the Meiji revolution. Rather, this outburst entailed the second revolution after the failure of social reforms under the furious imperialism. After WW2, Japan dismantled the imperial aristocracy, and achieved the equality of men and women and the redistribution of land to peasants. It was the origin of contemporary liberal democracy in Japan. In short, modern Japan formed itself through two revolutions: the Meiji Revolution and the large-scale reforms after WW2.

     If we consider modern Japanese history in this way, it reveals two remarkable phenomena: the dismantling of aristocracy by the royal restoration and a small number of sacrifices. It might be difficult to find a similar revolution. Yet, I think it is inappropriate to classify it as a peculiar phenomenon. On the contrary, it is much better to pose general questions from a comparative perspective. We rarely see the equalization of society by kingship. Yet, sometimes, we may be able to find the equalization by an autocratic government. Also, the number of deaths does matter in revolutions. Today, everybody will agree that it is much better to see revolutions with less sacrifice. In short, the Meiji Revolution can provide a precious opportunity to reconsider and widen the concept of revolution. We may be able to better understand revolutions in every corner of the world and to tackle the theme wiser.

     We can study other non-Western revolutions to pose different but important questions. For me, as one of Japanese, it is difficult to understand such revolutions as the Chinese and Middle Eastern revolutions. After overturning the dynasty, China saw very long civil wars and institutionalized the non-liberal polity. It looks that religion played a major part in the Middle Eastern revolutions. They look quite different from the Japanese experience. What has been achieved in these revolutions? What similarities do they have with other revolutions? What insights do they present in general to shed light on other revolutions? I am very excited to learn these questions in this series of global workshops.

     This project will continue for four years. We will have international workshops once a year from this year and next year to discuss the six revolutions. Then, we will hold an open conference in Tokyo in the autumn of 2022 to share our findings with the public. Please note that members are expected to present full papers at that moment for the publication of our achievement. 

     This time, we will pick up only three revolutions because of Covid-19 that force us to hold online workshops on Zoom. Yet, I sincerely hope that we can get together in Tokyo next year, in December. I look forward to listening to the presentations on all the six revolutions and start discussions of comparative studies.

     I sincerely expect that this online workshop will be a precious opportunity not only to start mutual learning but to deepen the understanding of each revolution. I am also happy if you are kind enough to present any suggestions to improve this project.

第1回 国際研究会
第2日目 :2020年12月19日 

 9時~11時半(JST)(20時@Princeton, 17時@Irvine) 


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■ 参加者(以下、敬称略)




海外研究協力者:David Bell、朴薫、Jeffrey Wasserstrom、Melissa Stockdale、Joan Cole





発表と討論ー第Ⅰ部 フランス革命

発表者:David Bell



発表:David Bell ‘The ‘Queen of the World’ and the ‘Volcano of the People’: The Public Sphere and Violence in the French Revolution’ 

次いで、岩井が革命前夜の知識人がどんな書物を通じてイギリス革命を理解していたのか尋ねた後、池田は、論文が取り上げた natureについて、当時、民衆の制御不能な力と同盟すべき味方という二つの意味を持っていたと指摘し、これに対してBellはnature の多義性は今後の研究課題だと応えた。次いで、三谷が対外戦争は民衆暴力を抑圧する手段だったのではないかと尋ねたところ、対外戦争は国内の一致団結をもたらすと想定されたものの、民衆の徴兵は逆により深刻な暴力を国内に生んだと指摘し、革命期にはナポレオン期と異なって内乱沈静の効果は無かったと述べた。
次いで、revolution の概念が再び議論となった。酒井は現代の中東では様々な革命が起きながら、目標が達成できていない、そのためThe Revolution と the revolutionary を区別する必要が生じていると指摘したが、Wasserstromは中国革命を念頭に、大文字の The Revolution の中には幾つかのrevolutions が含まれるが、中国語では言語的制約があって表現しにくいと述べ、Cole はアラビア語で革命は三種の意味がある(システムの転換、政権打倒、クーデタ)が、2011年の中東革命、とくに2011年と2013年のエジプトについては政権打倒とクーデタと両方があるので、困惑していると述べた。

発表と討論ー第II部 中国革命

発表者:David Bell



発表:Hideo Fukamachi ‘Sanctifying Violence: The Making of the National Revolutionary Army in 1920s China’ 


まず Wasserstrom が指定討論を行い、他のメンバーがこれに続いた。Wasserstromは、各軍隊を革命軍か否か、正当性の有無を識別する基準は二つあり、一つは人民の動員を肯定するか否か、もう一つは孫文崇拝の根拠を何にとるかであったとした。当時の軍隊はみな革命の擁護を標榜していたが、国民党と共産党は人民の動員を肯定しないものを軍閥と貶下した。また、両党は孫文崇拝を共有したが、国民党は階級闘争の否定、共産党は反帝国主義の側面をそれぞれ強調して互いに差別化したと指摘した。深町は今回の主眼は暴力に対する評価にあったとし、第1部でベルが取り上げたフランスと異なって、中国の革命派は最初から武力反乱を肯定していた点に特徴があったと述べた。 



* 録画、および日本語からの同時通訳を含む英語部分の録音を行った。 

第1回 国際研究会
第1日目 :2020年12月15日 

 18時~20時半(JST) (9時@Sheffield, 10時@Heidelberg) 


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■ 参加者(以下、敬称略)




海外研究協力者:Michael Braddick、Harald Fuess、朴薫




発表者:Michael Braddick





  Pen and Swords in Revolutions の第1回国際研究会を始めるにあたり、一言、その趣旨説明をさせていただきます。今日はご多忙の中、かつCovid19による様々な不自由を押して、メンバーの全員が参加して下さいました。呼びかけ人として、とてもうれしく存じております。 
 「革命」とは何か。その詳しい定義は研究会の中で議論するとして、さしあたりは、社会的権利の大規模な再編成が行われること、かつその過程で暴力行使や内戦が起きることと見なしておきましょう。ただし、権利の再編成と暴力・内戦は常に随伴するとは限りません。例えば明治維新(Meiji Revolution)は、支配身分の主要部分を解体する一方、死者は約3万人に留まりました。逆に17世紀ヨーロッパの30年戦争は、夥しい犠牲を出したにも関わらず、「革命」と見なしうるほどの権利の再編成を見ませんでした。 
  この研究会では、権利の再編成の面より、その手段の面に注目します。何が社会に暴力をもたらし、拡大させるのか、暴力はどんな条件下で抑制されるのか、暴力の中で獲得された改革の成果はどのように確保されるのか、革命の発端で暴力と同時に登場する公論(public opinion)は暴力とどのような関係に立ち、それはどう変るのか。こうした問題を、近代の主要な革命六つを取上げて、比較分析すること。それがこのプロジェクトの基本課題です。今回は、そのため、欧米と日本・韓国に在住する卓越した専門家が参集して下さいました。実りある議論が展開することを期待しております。 
  我々のプロジェクトの第三の意義は、「公論」(Public opinion)と「暴力」の関係を比較の焦点とすることです。革命の研究である以上、ある政治秩序の崩壊と再生がどのようにして起きたのか、その環境とプロセスの概要をまず把握しておかねばなりません。しかし、革命が内包する側面をすべて扱おうとすると、比較は不可能になります。むしろ、逆に焦点を絞った方が良い。その際、このプロジェクトで取上げる焦点は、「暴力」と「公論」の関係です。今までの予備的な検討によると、およそ全ての革命で、発端に言論と暴力の同時解放があったことが明らかとなっています。まず社会への不満がオープンに口にされ、それが抗議者と政府との双方で暴力行使に展開する。この紛争が初期の段階で収拾されないと、言論と暴力は相乗的に、互いに互いを刺激する形で拡大し、それが元の秩序を回復不可能なところまで崩壊させます。この自己崩壊プロセスがなぜ進行するのか、ある程度抑制された域に留まるならばその条件は何か。これが第一の課題です。逆に、革命が終るとき、暴力の恣意的行使が必ず排除されます。それは新政府による暴力の独占により実現されるのが常ですが、その政府の多くは圧制的になります。にもかかわらず、革命のいくつかでは、その後に非専制的な政体ができてゆきました。なぜ、言論の自由が容認され、やがて暴力の対極物としてpublic sphere と呼ばれるようになるのか。これは、現代の世界で、最も重要な論点として再浮上していることはご存じのとおりです。 
  以上、このプロジェクトを呼びかけた理由を一般的な形で申しました。以下では、同じことを私の明治維新(Meiji revolution)研究の観点から補足したいと存じます。 
  私は19世紀日本の政治社会史、とくに明治維新の研究を専門とします。いま3年前に刊行した通史を英語訳して刊行しようと企てており、再来年にはメンバーに差上げたいと期待しています。この研究会で私は問題を「公論と暴力」に絞った論文を発表する予定ですが、英語版はまだなので、とりあえず、Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History に寄稿した明治維新の記事をお目にかけました。 
  さて、この明治維新については、研究を始める前から、私には気がかりなことがありました。それは、日本の内外で、明治維新は単なる王政復古であり、革命とは見なしえないという解釈が一般的だったことです。      しかし、この変革によって、前代の支配身分だった武士は解体され、約400家あまりの上級貴族を除いて、平等な権利と義務を持つ「国民」が形成されました。これは「革命」と呼ぶほかはない大規模な権利の再編成です。また、支配身分の解体はどの社会にあっても容易なことではなく、その過程では夥しい死者が出るのが普通です。しかし、維新の場合、その死者は約3万人あまりで、これは先行するフランス革命の約155万という数字と比べると、著しく少ない。王政復古が貴族の大部分の権利を奪い、その過程では比較的に死者が少なかった。この特徴が何に由来するのか、それを解くのは興味深い課題です。 

  しかし、日本の内外では、これらの事実が軽視されてきました。これは、一方で、19世紀末以来、日本人が維新を王政復古の一点に絞ってその偉大さを顕賞しようと図ったことにあるように思います。Meiji Restoration という英訳名もそれに由来するのでしょう。他方、20世紀の世界では、革命のモデルをロシア革命に求めることが常識となりました。フランス革命もロシア・モデルを遡及させて理解されることがしばしばでした。このような知的環境(episteme)の下では、革命とは君主制の打倒であり、それは暴力の意図的行使によって実現されるというのが常識となりました。すると、王政復古による平等の実現はあり得ぬことであり、そこにはまやかしがあったはずだという疑いが生じます。確かに、天皇の下、上級貴族は特権を確保し、女性の権利も低く位置づけられたままでした。しかし、1890年に開会した国会は法律制定と予算審議の権利を君主と分ち持ち、その後1925年には選挙権が男性全員に拡張されました。ある程度、民主化と自由化が進んでいったのです。1930年代には対外侵略と言論抑圧が起きましたが、それは維新の直接結果とみることはできません。かつ、この暴発は自己破滅を導き、その結果、貴族の解体、女性の権利平等、小農への土地再配分といった構造改革が行われました。現代日本のリベラル・デモクラシーはそこに直接の出発点を持っています。つまり、近代の日本は、19世紀後半の明治維新、ついで20世紀半ばの戦後改革という、二つの革命をへて形成されたのです。



  マイケル・ブラディック(イギリス・シェフィールド大学)による報告「イングランド革命における暴力と公共圏 Violence and the Public Sphere in the English Revolution」が予稿に沿って行われた(約35分間)。同報告では、1640年代から1720年を「長いイングランド革命」とする新解釈が提示され、本プロジェクトの当初に三谷が提起した問いのうち、①暴力がいつまで持続したか、②公共圏はいかにして暴力から分離したか、③何が革命後の政権の性質を決めるか、④後世の人々がどのように革命を解釈したか、への解答が示された。 


   次いで三谷は宗教政策に話題を転じ、一神教の社会における宗教的寛容はどう実現されるのかを問うたが、ブラディックは寛容は当時「包括」と表現され、「包括」からカトリックを排除し、神の意志の解釈に踏み込まないことで、国教会のみならずプロテスタント諸派への寛容を実現したと応じた。フースがイギリスに現代まで続く反カトリック感情とそれを表現する「教皇主義 popery」とは何かを問うたところ、ブラディックは「教皇主義」は「イギリス的なるもの」への「他者」の表象として用いられてきたと答えた。 
   次いで、朴薫は、大衆とはどの階層を指すのか、また大衆の政治参加をどう評価していたのかを問い、平は革命を死者数や出版数のみで論じてもいいのかと問題提起した。ブラディックはこれに暴力も出版も内実に立ち入って考察するのは有用である、例えばイングランド内戦の死者はもっぱら軍隊の衝突によるもので、街頭暴力は少なく、この点はフランスと異なる、出版物でも両者の間には異同があったと答えた。次いで、池田がオラニエ公の地位について、オランダ共和国のstadtholderとイギリス王国のmonarchのいずれと見なされたのか、オランダもイギリスも共和主義的な共和国ではなく、フランス革命以前ではrepublic とmonarchy の二分法は成立しないのではないかと指摘したのに対しては、概ね肯定し、イギリスでそれが矛盾すると意識されたのはクロムウェルの時だけだったと答えた。  

* 第一日目の全体を録画し、質疑応答部分の英語訳の音声と合わせ、第二日目の北米組に送った。 

the 3rd preliminary workshop

November 22, 2020  

at Toyo Bunko (The Oriental Library) and on zoom

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Here is a summary of the third preliminary workshop held at Toyo Bunko and online November 22, 2020. Professor Hideo Fukamachi presented a paper concerning the Chinese Revolution to prepare for the first international meeting scheduled on December 15 and 19. This proceeding summarizes the major issues discussed. 


■The participants were: 

Hiroshi Mitani, Mie Shikano (at Toyo Bunko) 

Harumi Goto, Shuichi Wanibuchi, Hiroyuki Shiode, Yoshiro Ikeda, Hideo Fukamachi, Keiko Sakai, Jun Iwai, Koichi Yamazaki, Hun Park, Riho Hayakawa, Mazuma Hayamaru (via Zoom) 

Moderator: Shuichi Wanibuchi 

Presenter: Hideo Fukamachi 

Discussant: Keio Sakai 

■Paper: Hideo Fukamachi, ‘Sanctifying Violence: The Making of the National Revolutionary Army in 1920s China’ (in Japanese) 

( English version will be uploaded in the report of the 1st international meeting) 

■Major issues discussed were as follows: 

a) This paper provoked the discussion on the role of the military in revolutions. Organized violence plays a key role during revolutions although popular violence tends to attract our eyes. The mobilization of armed forces often escalates domestic conflicts into disorder. Yet, civil wars cannot be ended without the military power that totally defeats rivals and opponents. 

b) The character of the army changes in the course of revolution. It is closely related to the emergence of nationalism. 

In many traditional societies, there exist two kinds of armed forces: regular forces and paramilitary groups. A regular force consists of a cadre of nobles and the rank and file who lacked loyalty to the country as local vigilantes did. 

When the Qing dynasty was divided into several province, the provincial armies that used to serve the emperor turned into a kind of paramilitaries. They fought against each other to struggle for ruling power of China. Although the Chinese Nationalist Party’s National Revolutionary Army succeeded in reintegrating a major part of China in the 1920s and 1930s, the civil war did not end because another powerful force, the Chinese Communist Party, existed. Yet, nationalism infiltrated into the Army’s members during the resistant war against the Japanese invasion. 

In the early 20th-century Middle East, unlike in China, nation-state system was introduced by the Western powers after the Ottoman empire collapsed after WWI. In Iraq, for example, there was no armed body which could resist colonial rule other than the vigilante groups, which sought for local autonomy. Thus the regular army was established under colonial rule. After WW2, more and more lower officers in the regular army got influenced by communism and Arab nationalism and became the leaders who searched for the “true” independence from colonial rule. 

In the British Revolution, vigilante groups grew into paramilitaries that fought for and against the regular army. 

These three examples showed that civil wars tend to be prolonged if paramilitaries intervene in the conflicts. 

On the other hand, revolutionary France organized its national army to engage in long and large-scale foreign wars. In the process of mobilization, ordinary people who had spoken different dialects began to speak a ‘standard’ language, which nurtured a sense of French nationality. The army subdued domestic paramilitaries in the end. The American Revolution might be a similar case: a foreign war. In the Chinese case, Japanese invasion might have made paramilitaries into a unified national army. 

The Japanese experience was somewhat different. There were over 260 small states that had regular forces and that had allowed no vigilantes. All the regular forces were mobilized in the 1868 civil war and dismissed later in most states. Yet, there remained strong local forces on the winners’ side. After the new government failed in unifying them into the national army, they became paramilitaries and raised rebellions that were all suppressed at the end. The last and biggest rebellion, the Satsuma Rebellion, was crushed by the the conscription army that had been timely organized by the Meiji government” by a narrow margin. As for national consciousness, the 1868 civil war made the emperor a national symbol. Yet, people’s sense of national identity was crystalized much later during the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894 when the rank and file were conscripted from around the country. 


c) The strength of armed forces partly depends on its legitimacy, that is to say, the support from public opinion. During the Meiji Revolution, only the emperor could bestow legitimacy on military forces to be the imperial force. Yet, the handling of the media played a major role in most cases: propaganda, the suppression of the opposing media, and the appeal of its ideology. In the Chinese case, the National Revolutionary Army upheld Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, or the Principles of the People’s Nationality, Rights, and Livelihood. Although these principles could earn a certain degree of popularity, the Communist Party was more successful in mobilizing the masses. Also, the Chinese National Party was failed in controlling the opposing media than the Communist. 

In the French case, its ideals attracted foreign sympathizers. Some joined the French army to fight against their countries’ armies. 


d) The relation between the government and the military is also important. It varies during the course of revolutions. In the Chinese case, the party created its paramilitary (the Chinese Revolutionary Army) to integrate the Chinese nation. Yet, as the civil war became prolonged, the military became predominant over other governmental organs. (It took many years for the Chinese Nationalist Party to accept the supremacy of the civil government until the party acknowledged the open election of national leaders. In mainland China, the party-military complex still continues to be predominant.) 

As the Bonapartist regime also shows, the military power that has ended a revolution tends to maintain an authoritarian regime. It seldom allows to open the public sphere. France might be a rare case. Bonaparte’s engagement in large-scale wars broke down his own regime and gave room for a liberal polity. 

The Japanese case was one of rare kinds. In early modern Japan, each daimyo state continued to hold supremacy. One of the reasons was the scarcity of wars. Yet, only a few local armies were left untouched after the first civil war. After the suppression of paramilitaries, there were no threats from within and from outside the country. This was the backdrop of the introduction of parliamentary system into Japan in 1890. 

第3回 ワークショップ 



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■ 参加者
研究代表者:三谷 博







司会: 鰐淵秀一










1924年 中国国民党陸軍軍官学校(黄埔学校、広州)創立

1925年 孫文死去

1926年 国民革命軍北伐開始(孫文の遺志を継いだ国民党により)

司令官・蒋介石は、黄埔学校で革命軍人を手塩にかけて育てる。国民革命軍軍事顧問にはロシア赤軍のVasiy Blyukherを迎えている
















































鰐淵:今の質問の背景としては、アメリカが独立した、と言えるのは何年なのかという問題があって、いつが本当のfounding yearなのかというのがあるので、中国の事例ではどうなるのかうかがった次第だ。






















the 2nd preliminary workshop

March 14, 2020  at Toyo Bunko (The Oriental Library)

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Here is a brief summary of the 2nd preliminary workshop held at Toyo Bunko on March 14, 2020. I hope this is helpful for the coming preliminary workshop and the 1st international meeting tentatively rescheduled in mid-December, 2020.

   Japanese-speaking members gathered to discuss the British and Russian Revolutions. For the British  Revolution, Jun Iwai read a paper titled "Connecting the British and the French Revolution: 'Three British Revolutions' and 'Atlantic Revolutions.' "  Next, Masato Taira reviewed Yoshiro Ikeda's Roshia Kakumei [The Russian Revolution](Iwanami Shoten, 2017).

the attendants were:
Mitani, Tarira, Ikeda, Fukamachi, Iwai, Wanibuchi, Yamazaki, Hayakawa, Harald Fuess.

Major issues raised were as follows:

a) search for the chains among revolutions

Iwai attempted to find out the chains in time and space among revolutions by connecting the idea of 'three British revolutions' by J.G.A.Pocock and the concept of 'Atlantic revolutions' in the late 18th century by R. Palmer. He focused on the English thinkers who reflected on the connections  between the British Revolutions and the French revolution in the late 18th century. Edmund Burke and Richard Price shared the concern about the relationship between them even though their thoughts on the French revolution were quite opposite: Price appraised the Glorious Revolution as the starting point of political liberty in England and saw the American Revolution and the French Revolution as its successors. In contrast, Thomas Paine regarded the American Revolution and the French revolution as important because the two revolutions spread republicanism across the world and made a clear departure from the 17th-century British Revolutions.

Mitani raised a question about the usage of the term 'revolution' and asked if it might have been used synonymously with 'restoration' in the 17th century. Iwai responded that there were some evidences that during the English Revolution people already used the term 'revolution' as regime change beyond its original meaning as eternal motion of planets.

Yamazaki showcased some examples of French views on the British Revolutions. In the mid-18th century, French Philosophes such as de Montesquieu and Voltaire admired Britain's Parliamentary sovereignty after the Glorious Revolution. Just before and during the French Revolution, French People read both David Hume's The History of England that denounced Oliver Cromwell and Catharine Macauley's The History of England that praised him. Louis XVI was so Conscious about the execution of Charles I that he refused the advice of escape fro the capital at first. The revolutionaries who executed Louis XVI also bore the case of Charled I in mind to avoid any legal mistakes in court. De Robespierre was critical of both Cromwell and George Washington who had become political leader from military generals and strongly opposed to any foreign wars that often turned republics into military despotism.

Then, Mitani presented a methodological question about the conceptualization of 'chains.' Historians tend to assume the direct impacts from precursory revolutions on the succeeding ones. Yet, it is more important to focus on the appropriation of their predecessors by revolutionaries; what revolutions they referred to, what aspects they drew or ignored in former revolutions, what appropriation they made. In some cases, precedent revolutions directly tried to guide the following revolutions; the French attempted to 'export' their revolutionary principles, and the Comintern gave directions to non-western revolutionaries. Their efforts often led to the power struggles between 'nativists' and 'internationalist' in the later revolutions.

b) microscopic approach to revolutions and the lost possibilities

Ikeda pointed out the aim of his recent book on the Russian Revolution. He focused on the revolutionaries' political trial and error during the eight months between the February and the October Revolutions in 1917, as contrasted with his former works that dealt with the long-term process of nation-state building from the last decades of the Russian empires to the first decades of Soviet Russia. This microscopic approach was adopted to interpret the revolutions as the process of collapse and to highlight the denial of European liberalism by Russian people.

He wrote the efforts of Kadets who sought to institutionalize a constitutional-parliamentary regime in Russia. Yet, their voice was refused by the people who considered Kadets' liberal discourse as alien and desired to change their dire situation at once. Ikeda stressed the importance of the initial condition of Russian society where the 'elite', or the 'public', and the 'people'lived in different cultures. When people poured into the street, the 'public' had no words to persuade them. A vulnerable public sphere was overturned by uprisings, a traditional way of resistance. This condition let the Bolsheviks to take power as an only political group who talked and behaved in such a manner that the people could understand.

To Ikeda's reflection, Fukamachi gave a few comments to compare the Russian and Chinese Revolutions. The first point is that the Russian Revolution was a typical one of the 20th century in which the masses and their organizations took a major part. It greatly differed from the British and French Revolutions in that sense. The second is the Russian society had been divided into hereditary classes like other European societies; therefore political parties were organized based on those classes with an ideological spectrum from right to left. On the contrary, Chinese society almost lacked a hereditary class system; as a consequence, political parties emerged in a different way. The third is the cohesion of intermediary bodies, which was also weak in China. Russian villages and towns seemed to have play an important role in the revolution. However, the Russian and Chinese Revolutions were alike in the sense that people accepted the negation of private land ownership based on the traditional idea of communal land owning system.

One of the most amazing characteristics of the Russian Revolution is the intensity of changes during a short period of time. Drastic changes occurred in a single year. It took almost forty years for China to have similar changes take place. Fukamachi thinks this was becasuse the Romanov dynasty's power was highly decentralized since the mid-19th century, which led to the rivalry between Beijing and the southern and central provinces in the 1911 Revolution.

Ikeda discussions revealed the variety of local conditions in each society. The distribution of power in an ancient regime and its changes in revolution define the mode of destruction, the speed of changes and the length of time necessary for reintegration. We will continue to search for the determinants that characterized each revolution through the comparative studies of revolutions. 


 I am grateful to the paticipants in the second workshop to share these insights and I wish to develop them further in the next preliminary workshop and in the first international meeting in December.

(MITANI Hiroshi)


2020年3月14日 於・東洋文庫

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  ( 1 ) イ ギ リ ス 革 命 と フ ラ ン ス 革 命 を つ な ぐ  

  ― 「 三 つ の ブ リ テ ン 革 命 」 と 「 大 西 洋 革 命」

報告=岩井淳 司会=山﨑耕一、記録=鰐淵秀一 











(2)書評と討論: 池田嘉郎『ロシア革命』(岩波新書、2017年)
 評者:平正人 司会:深町英夫、記録:早丸一真(ゲストスピーカー)







































the 1st preliminary workshop
Nov. 30, 2019 at Toyo Bunko(The Oriental Library)

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Here is a brief summary of the 1st preliminary workshop held at Toyo Bunko on November 30, 2019. I hope this is helpful for the coming international meeting scheduled on June 6 and 7, 2020.

1. the project members -final version.

 ・Meiji Revolution
   Japanese members (hereafter, JM): MITANI Hiroshi, SHIODE Hiroyuki
   International members (hereafter, IM): PARK Hun, Harald Fess
 ・British Revolution
   JM: GOTO Harumi, IWAI Jun
   IM: Michael Braddick
 ・American Revolution
 ・French Revolution
   IM: David Bell
 ・Chinese Revolution
   IM: Jeffrey Wasserstrom
 ・Russian Revolution
   JM: IKEDA Yoshiro
   IM: Melisssa Stockdale
 ・Middle Eastern Revolution
   JM: SAKAI Keiko
   IM: Joan Cole

2. proceedings of the first workshop

Japanese-speaking members gathered in November 2019 to start discussions in  preparation for the first international meeting in June 2020. As a basis for discussion we jointly reviewed two books lately published by the project members [in Japanese]: Koichi Yamazaki, Furance Kakumei [The French Revolution: the Birth of a Republic] (Tosui Shobo, 2018) and Hiroshi Mitani, Ishin-shi Saiko [A New Look at the Meiji Revolution](NHK Shuppan, 2017).

The attendants were:
Mitani, Shiode, Goto, Iwai, Wanibuchi, Taira, Yamazaki, Hayakawa, Fukamachi, Ikeda.

Major issues raised were as follows:

a) The definition of Revolution 
Yamazaki adopted the four criterions of a revolution in his book: 1) the reform of polity, 2) the rise and maturation of the public opinion, 3) the demand for liberty, and 4) the irreversible transformation of social order. He argued that one can call a political incident a revolution if the first three criteria are satisfied and, furthermore, one can regard it a 'social revolution' or 'thorough revolution' if it satisfies the fourth criterion in addition to the other three.

The participants agreed that the French Revolution satisfies all the four conditions. According to these criteria, Mitani pointed out that Japan's Meiji Revolution satisfied 1) by the shift from the double-headed federation to the single-headed monolithic polity and 4) by the abolition of the ruling Samurai class and the class system itself, while it lacked 2) and 3). Mitani confessed the difficulty in understanding the Meiji Revolution because there were no visible demand for liberty nor the public sphere nor the media for political discussions during the last ten years of the Tokugawa period. Yet, there were lively discussions among the Samurai class in closed meetings. And, just after the establishment of the new Meiji government, the public sphere suddenly emerged and the government carried out the abolition of hereditary status system.

The specialists of the British and American revolutions also raised the examples of the more 'moderate' revolutions that lacked 4). Goto pointed out that the British Revolution(s) did not change the gentry' hegemony and Wanibuchi commented on the continuation of the ruling elites before and after the American Revolution.

This discussion revealed that there are many variants in the political events that have been called 'revolution.'  Mitani thinks we can propose a simple definition: a drastic reorganization of collective rights, in which the decisive reorganization in political structure or in human rights took place.

From this, another question was raised: How did people come to call a big political change 'revolution' that originally meant an eternal rotation of planets? From the analytical perspective, 'rebirth' that French people used in 1789 might have been much better. There left much room for pursuing intellectual history on this key term.

b) Violence
There are many differences in the two revolutions: the French Revolution saw about 1,550,000 death toll, while the Meiji Revolution saw about 30,000 in the country with an almost similar population. What was behind this strange contrast?

One salient factor was the scale of foreign wars involved. France fought large-scale wars with neighboring dynasties, while Japan fought only a few small-scale battles that ended at once despite the fact that many politicians insisted on the armed 'expulsion of barbarians.'

On this matter, Ikeda pointed out the difference in international relations. Japan had enjoyed more than 200 years of peace before the revolution because of its isolation from neighboring dynasties. It had small-scale trade with China without any diplomatic ties and welcomed Korean envoys only 12 times during the entire period. Western countries that urged Japan to open the door eschewed wars against Japan. Althogh Britain had planned a punitive war when Japan looked reluctant to keep treaties, it gave up after Japan finally accepted an opening policy.

The seclusion afforded the Japanese to have much time, 10 years, for the political negotiations among about 30 major daimyo states to establish a new polity which would take over the Tokugawa regime. Their task was simpler than that of the French: to change early modern Japan, a federation of about 260 states, into a more integrated state under the emperor in order to defend it from possible invasions from the West. Although there were a few skirmishes and two major battles, the toll of victims was about 14,000. The Meiji government faced a large-scale rebellion 10 years later from the army that had contributed to the former civil war. However, after the rebellion was suppressed with about 12,000 victims, Japan has faced no civil war until today.

In contrast, France was about 400,000 death tolls during civil wars. There must have been various factors behind this. Yet, Mitani indicated that Yamazaki's book suggests one important factor that entangled domestic issues with foreign wars: the Directoire chose to continue and expand foreign wars to establish an empire in order to suppress domestic wars and this paved the way to the military government, especially under Napoleon Bonaparte.

The Meiji government sent the army to Taiwan, a periphery of Chinese empire, 7 years after its establishment to appease its military. Yet, it quickly settled the conflict with China and kept peace with any foreign countries for 20 years till it began the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894.

Ikeda, a specialist of the Russian Revolution, pointed to the lack of time for deliberation and negotiation in the cases of European revolutions. This reminds us the case of China. When the Xinhai revolution began in 1911, there were few armed rebellions in China, although China would experience harsh civil wars later in the 20th century.


I am grateful to the participants in the first workshop to share these insights and I wish to develop them further in the second preliminary workshop in mid-March and in the first international meeting in June.

(MITANI Hiroshi)


2019年11月30日 於・東洋文庫

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研究代表者:三谷 博 









(3)civic nationalism の起源としてのフランス革命


  評者が最も重要視したのは、(1)「革命」と「社会革命」の定義で、その上で明治維新とフランス革命を比較した。本書の序章は「革命」の条件に次を挙げる。① 「国制の改革」②「民間の世論」③「自由の要求」④ 「社会構成・社会秩序の変化」 うち、「革命」は①②③、「社会革命(より徹底した革命)」は①から④まで含とする。フランス革命は後者に該当し、明治維新にも④に相当する面が見出されるとした。

  評者が次に重視したのは(3)civic nationalism の起源であり、人の移動・戸籍の管理・パスポート発行などに注目して、フランス革命はシヴィック・ナショナリズムの起源として位置づけられるのではないかとコメントした。 






  ここで後藤は、フランス人はイギリス革命などの先行革命をどのように表象していたのかと質問した。「イギリス革命の失敗」とか、「アメリカの実験」という参照の仕方があったのかとの問いである。これに対し、鰐淵はアメリカにおけるthe American Revolutionという名称の公式文書における初出は1779年なので、アメリカは名誉革命を参照としていたと考えられると延べ、アメリカ革命は本書の条件①②③には当てはまるが、④に当てはまるかどうかは長年庭たる議論があることを指摘した。


 司会=岩井淳 評者=池田嘉郎 記録=早丸一真(ゲストスピーカー)














  眼から鱗だったのは、日本が環境的に孤立していた故に時間的余裕を持っていたという指摘で、確かに多数派工作は時間への期待がないとできなかった。 かつ、それは近世の分権的政体ゆえに不可欠でもあった。









  一方、深町は、中国では身分制度がなかったので、「身上がり」が主題になることは見られず、君主制から共和制への転換を実現した辛亥革命においても、民衆の革命への関わりは維新と異なる形を取った。公論や暴力の主要な主体はエリート層であり、社会構造の制度的な再編は課題となっていない。辛亥革命は外圧・国難を乗り切るために近代国家へ移行したという意味で、トルコ革命がやや近いかと述べた。 平は、今日はフランス革命はとても暴力的で、明治維新は公論が広まったというふうに聞こえたが、公論と暴力は革命の中で両立するものなのか、あるいは、公論が先行する革命には暴力が出にくいのか、暴力が先行する革命には公論が生まれにくくなるのかと問うた。














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